Jordan Peterson, Dan Dennett and the Banshee

Introduction

In this blog-post I will consider the nature of archetypes (as defended in different ways by Jung and Peterson and memes (as defended by Dan Dennett), and I will evaluate the evidence for them. I will then outline the Irish folk-myth of the Banshee and discuss whether memes or archetypes offer the most compelling evidence for the nature of the myth.

                                      Part 1: JUNGIAN ARCHETYPES

Jung being an agnostic about the existence of God and a person who heavily emphasised his own direct experiences mean that in popular mind he is viewed as a pseudo-scientist. When he speaks about religious archetypes being inescapable even for those who describe themselves as atheists he is sometimes interpreted as a religious mystic. Hence in the imagination of some of Jung’s critics, his arguments for the collective unconscious, and archetypes are viewed as religiously motivated speculation. Jung though considered archetypes and the collective unconscious empirical claims which could be justified on scientific grounds.

Freud’s primary focus was on the repressed unconscious. On Freud’s conception human children are animals with aggressive and sexual drives, while at the same time being defenceless members of a social group that indoctrinates them. As the child grows and develops in their social and familial groups they will eventually learn to repress some of these aggressive and sexual urges. However, the urges, though unconscious; can still play a role in the subject’s life, even though they may not be aware of these impulses. A lot of Freud’s therapeutic work was focused on helping people become aware of dramas from their early childhood that they were still unconsciously playing out in their adult life. Freud did leave a role for the unrepressed and instinctual unconscious but his primary emphasis was on repressed unconscious states and how they affected behaviour.

Jung believed that Freud underestimated the importance of the collective unconscious. For Jung the collective unconscious was a set of instinctive patterns that is shared by all humans. These instinctive patterns may never have been conscious, but according to Jung these instincts drive our conscious behaviour in ways we are entirely unaware of. Jung argues that it is the job of the psychotherapist to bring these instinctive patterns to consciousness. He argues that the archetype is very similar to the collective unconscious; and that one could consider archetypes as unconscious images of the instincts themselves (Jung: Archetypes and The Collective Unconscious p. 44).

Jung proposed the existence of Archetypes in relation to his theory of dreams. Freud’s famous “discovery” that dreams had an unconscious significance was related to his own analysis of a dream he had which revealed Oedipal fantasies of his in relation to his mother. Freud turned his interpretation of dreams into a developmental story where it is a universal feature of children as their lives unfold. Jung accepted Freud’s interpretation of some dreams as revealing Oedipal conflicts. However, according to Jung, a close analysis of his patient’s dreams revealed a series of patterns which corresponded to universal motifs that turned up in the world’s mythologies. Jung prided himself in being a scholar who read widely in mythologies and religions in both eastern and western cultures and discovered universal patterns in this diverse literature. Furthermore, Jung claimed, that when analysing the dreams of patients their dreams sometimes revealed details of ancient mythologies which the patient had never experienced in their daily life:

“Consequently, we must look for motifs which could not possibly be known to the dreamer and yet behave functionally in his dream in such a manner as to coincide with the functioning of the archetype known from historical sources.” ( Jung ‘The Concept of the Collective Unconscious’ p. 49)

 

Jung reasoned that if the patient never encountered the material in his daily life but exhibited some unconscious knowledge of the myth it is a reasonable assumption that the patient’s knowledge of the myth was innate[1]. His argument could be seen as a crude version of what Chomsky would call a poverty of stimulus argument. A person acquired knowledge of x but they don’t ever encounter x in their environment therefore it is impossible they learned x, hence x must be innate knowledge. In Chomsky’s case he provides precise syntactic constructions which he claimed children could go much or all of their life without encountering, and linguists have corpora to study the actual linguistic environment of children. And they have mathematical modellers who can design learning models which can be used to prove whether it is possible for a learner to acquire x given the data they are exposed to. Jung never articulated his argument for innate archetypes in this clear a manner. Hence it is harder to test his claims to either refute or confirm them. Furthermore given that Jung claims that these motifs are universal themes in our myths it is hard to give much credence to his claim that people never experience these universal myths.

Jung didn’t just rely on a poorly worked out poverty of stimulus argument to justify his belief in archetypes. He also argued that the concept had a long pedigree and was justified by the ethno-science of his time. He correctly noted that archetype concept was originally postulated by Plato. As every first year philosophy student knows, Plato argued that humans have innate ideas of concepts such of Justice, equality etc. Like Jung when arguing for innate ideas, Plato relied on poverty of stimulus arguments. In his Meno dialogue Plato illustrates Socrates getting an illiterate slave to demonstrate knowledge of geometry through just asking the slave questions. Plato draws the conclusion that since the slave was never taught geometry and yet demonstrated an understanding of geometry it is clear that the slave has some kind of innate knowledge of it[2].

Plato’s arguments were criticised by Aristotle amongst many others. But a primary reason that Plato’s arguments weren’t accepted was because he had no compelling explanation of where this innate knowledge came from. Jung noted that with the theory of evolution we have a good explanation of innate knowledge in the form of instincts. Jung goes on to describe his view as a combination of the views of Kant and Plato (Jung ‘The Concept of the Archetype’ p.77). Strangely enough Jung doesn’t touch on the rationalist/empiricist debate on innate ideas that Locke and Leibniz had. Jung skips from Plato right up to Kant; this is a strange move, given the influence the rationalist-empiricist debate had on Kant.

What is even stranger is that when he is criticising Plato’s argument Jung does so from the point of view of an empiricist:

“Were I a philosopher, I should continue in this Platonic strain and say: Somewhere, in “a place beyond the skies,” there is a prototype or primordial image of the mother that is pre-existent and supraordinate to all phenomena in which the “maternal,” in the broadest sense of the term, is manifest. But I am an empiricist, not a philosopher; I cannot let myself presuppose that my peculiar temperament, my own attitude to intellectual problems, is universally valid. Apparently this is an assumption in which only the philosopher may indulge, who always takes it for granted that his own disposition and attitude are universal…” (Jung ‘On the Concept of the Archetype’ p.75)

There is a lot to unpack in the above quote. Firstly Jung is correctly attacking Plato’s belief that innate ideas come from some abstract realm that we lived in during a previous life. Jung is surely correct that this is a poor idea. But Jung not only attacks Plato for coming to his unwarranted conclusion; Jung says that Plato came to the absurd conclusion BECAUSE he was a philosopher.

A possible interpretation of the above Jung claim is that he is criticising Plato for engaging in idle speculation of a type that cannot be tested empirically. Jung seemed to believe that a correct scientific approach would have been to acknowledge that we have innate understanding of certain universal concepts without projecting these universal concepts into some abstract realm.

There is some substance to Jung’s criticism of Plato. But in Plato’s defence he believed that since he had discovered innate concepts it was up to him to explain where these concepts came from. His explanation may not seem compelling to us with the benefit of two thousand years of accumulated knowledge but it was a nice attempt to explain otherwise inexplicable phenomena. Now with our knowledge of modern biology and evolutionary science those compelled by Plato’s argument for innate ideas can nest them within evolutionary science.

Jung though stretches his criticism of Plato to all Philosophers who he charges with assuming that their own idiosyncratic nature reflects facts about the cosmos. Jung then distinguishes himself from philosophers by calling himself an empiricist. Now as is well known; empiricism is a philosophical position associated with three philosophers; John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. Empiricism is a philosophical system that argues that all our knowledge claims are justified by reference to experience. For the empiricist while the philosopher should theorise freely; his theories can only be judged true or false when faced with the tribunal of experience.

When Jung argues that he is not a philosopher he is an empiricist this will raise eyebrows. To say that one is not a philosopher because one holds a particular philosophical epistemology sounds very strange. Nonetheless, there are ways that in which one could try to justify the claim that one is not a philosopher but an empiricist. It could be argued that empiricist epistemology is the epistemology used in scientific theorising, it’s pragmatic success has led to empirical science; and empiricists nowadays are scientists who don’t have any use for philosophical speculation. However, there is little reason to think that the above sketchy unimpressive argument is what Jung had in mind. In fact as we will explore in a minute there is little reason to think that Jung’s position is actually a form of empiricism at all.

While Jung believed that Plato was wrong in his explanation of the nature of our innate ideas he still thought that Plato was correct that innate ideas existed. Jung was impressed with Kant’s arguments against metaphysics, or rather, Kant’s argument that metaphysics can still exist but it must give up the proud name of ontology. Kant’s Copernican revolution in philosophy involved  the claim that philosophy couldn’t discover the ‘thing-in-itself’ which existed beyond our mode of cognition, rather the job of the philosopher was to discover the a-priori structures that were the conditions of possibility of our making any knowledge claims whatsoever.

Jung strongly endorses Kant’s arguments:

“Significantly enough, it is Kant’s doctrine of categories, more than anything else, that destroys in embryo every attempt to revise metaphysics in the old sense of the word, but at the same way paves the way for a re-birth of the Platonic spirit. If it be true that there can be no metaphysics transcending human reason, it is no less true that there can be no empirical knowledge that is not already caught and limited by the a priori structure of cognition.” ( Jung ‘The Concept of the Archetype’ p.76)

The above quote seems to place Jung in a very strange position he is labelling himself an empiricist while arguing that a form of transcendental idealism is the philosophical position he adopts.

To call oneself a Kantian and an empiricist is to use idiosyncratic language that just invites confusion. Kant after all famously thought that both rationalist and empiricist epistemologies were incomplete and needed to be replaced by Kant’s transcendental philosophy. How far Jung wanted to follow this Kantian turn is unclear; it is probable that Jung was just situating his views with Kant and Plato because of the prestige these thinkers are held in by academics. It is like as if Jung were saying to “look my archetype idea isn’t that crazy; it has eminent philosophical pedigree, my views are partially in line with Kant and Plato, though unlike them I can ground my archetypes in biology and psychology”.

When Jung called himself an empiricist and then went on to equate his views with two philosophers paradigmatically opposed to empiricism he appears to be confused. However, Jung can be rescued from the charge of confusion; a charitable interpretation of Jung’s claims is that while he found things he agreed with in Kant and Plato, Jung believed that they had discovered only partial truths. In order to further develop the arguments of Plato and Kant one must turn to the study of empirical psychology. When Jung was calling himself an empiricist he would have been more accurate to note that his views are grounded in empirical psychology. That this is the interpretation that Jung intended can be seen in the quote below:

“There is an a priori factor in all human activities, namely the inborn, preconscious and unconscious individual structure of the psyche. The pre-conscious psyche-for example, that of a new born infant- is not an empty vessel into which, under favourable conditions, practically anything can be poured. On the contrary, it is a tremendously complicated, sharply defined individual entity which appears indeterminate to us only because we cannot see it directly. But the moment the first visible manifestations of psychic life begin to appear, one would have to be blind not to recognize their individual character, that is, the unique personality behind them.” (ibid p. 77)

The above quote could have been written by Noam Chomsky or Steven Pinker, the position is arguing that humans aren’t blank slates created entirely from culture but have a specific nature they inherit that partially determines how we develop as individuals. So despite Jung’s strange use of philosophical language his meaning is quite clear. There are innate biological archetypes that determine the way humans structure the data of experience. As we saw above though, Jung’s arguments for these archetypes relied on vague poverty of stimulus arguments, and appeals to the authority of a couple of famous philosophers.

In fairness to Jung despite the shakiness of his archetypal story he does present (limited) evidence to support it. In Jung’s years of extensive analysis with patients he claims have discovered themes in their dreams which had identical motifs which occurred in obscure texts that the patient couldn’t have read. Furthermore some evolutionary psychologist’s today claim to have found evidence for universal themes in our myths. (See: Robert King ‘A Regiment of Monstrous Women: Female Archetypes and Life History Theory’ 2016). So there is some evidence from disciplines outside of analytical psychology which support Jung’s conjectures about archetypes.

One of the strongest supporters of Jung’s archetypal story is the clinical psychologist Jordan Peterson. In order to flesh out Jung’s take on archetypes with the strongest possible evidence in the next section I will discuss Peterson’s take on archetypes and the evidence he presents to justify the postulation of their existence.

 

 

Part 2: Jordan Peterson’s conception of Archetypes

Peterson launched a large scale and compelling defence of archetypes in his 1999 book ‘Maps of Meaning’. A clinical psychologist by training Peterson primarily used evidence from developmental psychology to support his belief in the existence of archetypes. One aspect of Peterson’s book that is surprising is the lack of evidence he garners from the work of evolutionary psychologists such as Cosmides and Tooby (1992), Pinker (1994, 1997) etc when defending archetypes. Today as a proud member of the IDW Peterson goes out of his way to stress agreement with the work of Steven Pinker, Brett Weinstein, Geoffrey Miller etc. But in his ‘Maps of Meaning’ Peterson never really engages with Evolutionary Psychology at all.

Evolutionary Psychologists who were writing at around the time that Peterson was writing his ‘Maps of Meaning’ were arguing for massive modularity in which the brain used different encapsulated processing units for: language, folk psychology, vision, folk physics etc. Evolutionary psychologists were busy working on constructing theories about how these modules were selected for in the environment of our ancestors and how these modules were dissociable. Thus a person through a developmental disorder would not develop the ability to use the folk psychology module, but could have a functioning folk physics module. This evolutionary psychology would seem to be perfect for a Jungian like Peterson who was interested in an updated empirical defence of Jung.

However, for whatever reason, in his ‘Maps of Meaning’ we don’t find any real engagement with evolutionary psychology. Nor does Peterson engage with the work of developmental psychologists like Sue Carey, or Liz Spelke whose studies into infant cognition were being used to argue that infants having innate concepts of number, object, causation etc. Carey and Spelke’s work involved detailed experimental evidence that could be used to support Jung’s concept of archetypes. Likewise, the work of evolutionary psychologists like Pinker, Cosmides and Tooby offered support for Jung’s claim that there were a-priori constraints on the way we interpret the world.

Another avenue that Peterson could have gone to for support of Jung’s concept of archetypes was in the work of cognitive scientists Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor who in different ways argued for innate concepts which somewhat supported a Jungian take on archetypes[3]. But Peterson made use of none of these theorists in defence of Jungian archetypes. Instead Peterson defended archetypes from the point of view that we would today call enactivism.

                                           Peterson’s Enactivism

One interesting aspect of Peterson’s theorising is his heavy emphasis on actual behaviour and its consequences. One of the central philosophical texts of the twentieth century was Quine’s magnum opus ‘Word and Object’ which amongst other things offered a naturalist/behaviourist explanation of how people managed to refer to objects in the external world. Quine, infamously, took the child’s ability to achieve objective reference to be parasitic on the child’s mastery of the syntax of quantification. Peterson though considered the question from the point of view of the evolution of the species. On Peterson’s picture humans don’t typically use language in the referential manner of the empirical sciences. Rather language is a tool that is used to cope with the flux of experience.

Peterson’s views on linguistic usage are primarily derived from the work of George Lakoff, and the later Wittgenstein etc. In a foot note where he discusses Wittgenstein; Peterson makes the following point:

“This means that determinate experience must be considered an emergent property of behaviour to a degree that is presently unspecifiable…The word itself, as case in point, can no longer reasonably be regarded as a “label” for a “thing” (Wittgenstein, L. 1968). The notion that a concept is a label for an object is nothing but a slightly higher order version of the same error. Wittgenstein pointed out, essentially, that our sense of unified “thing” is not simply given. We tend to think of the objects we perceive as “being there” in some essential sense; but we see the tree before the branches. Despite this conceptual phenomenon, the tree has no objective precedence over the branches (or the leaves, or the cells that make up leaves, or the forest etc…Wittgenstein solved the “words are not labels for objects” problem by positing that a word was a tool. A word plays a role in a game and is a kin to the chessmen in chess…Wittgenstein was driving at a general principle; an object is defined even perceived (categorized as a unity rather than a multiplicity), with regard to its utility as a means to a given end. In a basic sense an object is a tool or an obstacle… What can reasonably be parsed out of the environmental flux as an object is therefore determined in large part by the goal we have in mind while interacting with that flux.” (ibid p. 477)

It is worth looking closely at the above passage and picking apart its meaning. Peterson is emphasising the pragmatic nature of word usage for people as they go about their daily activities. But he is also making a point about the cognitive processes we use to understand the world around us. On his picture we view things under an aspect depending on what we want to do with the objects we are engaging with. Peterson’s take on the topic is thus far a sensible one. Our minds don’t mirror the external world as a result of some kind of structural isomorphism, rather we as embodied creatures cope with the flux of experience as we explore our environment. The world appears to us because of our embodied nature and interests and needs as we interact with our environment:

“Brain structure necessarily reflects embodiment, despite the archaic presumption of the independence of spirit and matter (or soul and body, or mind and body), because the body is, in a primary sense, the environment to which the brain has adapted…The combination of hand and eye allowed human beings to experience and analyze the (emergent) nature of things. This ability, revolutionary as it was, was dramatically extended by application of hand-mediated, spoken (and written) language.” (ibid pp. 63-65).

The above picture emphasises our body as an active tool to cope with our environment not a passive mirror reflecting some “thing-in-itself”.

Peterson isn’t denying that we can use language to pick out objects in our environment; he is just noting that reference in the language of our evolutionary ancestors wouldn’t have had the precise referential apparatus that we take for granted in science. He draws a nice distinction between what the child learns when he is learning the meaning of a particular word and the connotations that the word will have. Thus the child will learn the meaning of the word ‘chair’; in other words what set of things in the environment the word picks out. But the child will also learn the emotional resonances of the term chair. The child will associate the term with the emotional experiences he has had with the term ‘chair’ e.g. the child will unconsciously register the parents scolding and praise around his interaction with chairs.

So there is a dual aspect of the child’s understanding of a term. It is helpful to think of this distinction in relation to some key terms in the philosophy of language. Peterson is not an analytic philosopher; in his ‘maps of meaning’ he cites only two analytic philosopher’s the later Wittgenstein, and Ryle[4]. It is a great pity that Peterson doesn’t engage with Analytic Philosophy more given the incredible amount of work that has been done on linguistic meaning over the last 140 years. It is beyond the scope of this piece to go into a detailed analysis of the philosophy of language, however it will be helpful to consider Peterson’s views in relation to two different conceptions of reference in natural language.

We saw above that Peterson distinguishes between the reference of a term that is socially learned and the emotional connotations that the child will have to the term. In the philosophy of language there is a debate between referential theories of meaning (Kripke, Putnam) and descriptive theories of meaning (Frege, Wittgenstein, Searle). When Peterson speaks about a child learning the meaning of chair he is ambiguous about what that entails. In one sense it could be argued that Peterson is ambiguous about the issue because it is irrelevant to his purposes. However, it is worth exploring the issue a bit as it has connections to his distinction between reference and emotional connotation.

As we mentioned above Peterson was heavily influenced by the work of the cognitive linguist George Lakoff. Lakoff’s (1987) work was highly critical of the objectivist paradigm in the philosophy of language and linguistics which tried to understand natural language reference interms of model theory. Lakoff argued (based on a formal proof by Putnam) that the model theory explanation was unsatisfactory as it was logically impossible to fix a unique domain of reference for any model of language that was being used. Lakoff then argued that research in empirical psychology showed a better way to explain linguistic usage. On Lakoff’s picture our language results from our embodied engagement with our environment, and the core of our language is constructed from metaphors drawn primarily from our embodied experience.

Peterson’s philosophy of language, which is based on the work of Wittgenstein and Lakoff, is largely of the pragmatist variety. On Peterson’s world view language users typically don’t use language in an explicitly referential manner rather they use language for intersubjective communication. Words have meaning on Peterson’s world view but the meaning isn’t provided by referring to mind independent objects. Since its inception analytic philosophers have also been critical of the use of naive referential semantics. Some of the primary criticisms of naive referentialism have come from those propounding the descriptive theory of meaning. Below are some of the main arguments that descriptivist’s use against naive referentialism:

  • Co-referring terms:

 

Frege notes that ‘The Morning Star’ and ‘The Evening Star’; refer to the same object. Nonetheless they have different meanings. A person could understand the meaning of ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star’ without knowing that they refer to the same object. Conclusion meaning isn’t the same thing as reference.

Clark Kent and Superman refer to the same person so you could substitute Superman for Clark Kent in any sentence without changing the truth value of the sentence. However this characteristic changes when you factor in belief sentences. Thus the sentence ‘Superman is bullet proof’ is true; and if you change the word ‘Clark Kent’ for ‘Superman’ you will get the sentence ‘Clark Kent is bullet proof’ which again is true. However if you add ‘John believes that Superman is Bullet Proof’ let us say that this sentence is true; now if you change ‘Clark Kent’ for ‘Superman’ the truth value of the sentence can change as John may not know that Clark Kent is the same man as superman. The difficulty of substitution of co-extensive words in belief contexts has serious consequences for us when we try to understand the logic of discourse extensionally. However, we need not worry about the logical status of language in our discussion here. The primary point in the above discussion is that the referential status of our words seems to be determined by meanings we attach to the terms.

But what is this meaning we are attaching to words? One way to explicate the meaning of a term is that it consists of a description of the object it refers to. Thus if we take the word ‘Chair’ the meaning attached to it could be { four legged objects that you sit on }.

  • Fictional names:

When I use words to speak about fictional creatures such as a Unicorn, or Sherlock Holmes; it is hard to explicate these words in terms of a referential relation. The words don’t refer to anything in the external world. Nonetheless the words have meaning.

  • The Very Large and the Very Small:

We can speak about sub-atomic particles, and our theories can refer to them, but any reference to them will need to be couched into an incredibly complex conceptual scheme. Likewise we can refer to the entire universe. But referring to the universe is not something that can be done directly; like in the case of sub-atomic particles any reference is going to be deeply enmeshed in a complex conceptual scheme. So with the very large and the very small a direct reference theory of meaning is out.

  • Impossible objects

A clichéd impossible object is a ‘Roundsquare’ the object by virtue of holding contradictory properties cannot exist in the world. Hence it cannot be referred to. Nonetheless it does have meaning. Hence meaning is not equal to reference.

 

Peterson and Descriptivism

There is a sense in which Peterson is a descriptivist about word meanings. We saw above that his views on meaning are taken from Lakoff and Wittgenstein both of whom emphasised the fact that any ostensive definition will require a lot of stage setting. The stage setting required from Lakoff would be his cognitive models derived from our embodied experience interacting with the world, while Wittgenstein would focus on our shared cultural practices. Peterson is a bit different than either Lakoff or Wittgenstein in one key respect; Peterson believes in archetypes which to some degree determine the limits of our thought.

As we saw above Jung’s archetypes were similar to what modern evolutionary psychologists would call innate concepts. If we try and translate Jung into the language of analytic philosophy; we could argue when a particular situation triggers an archetype the person will end up interpreting the data of experience using an implicit description provided by our evolutionary past. The stage setting that goes into our attempts to pick out objects in our environment is provided by our evolutionary history.

Peterson would agree with Jung that the stage setting that goes into ostensive definition is archetypal in nature; except Peterson would argue that the so called archetypes are patterns of behaviour which we implicitly understand on a procedural level. We can draw out the morals of these patterns of behaviour when we translate them into explicit semantic knowledge:

“It is only after behavioural (procedural) wisdom has been represented in episodic memory and portrayed in drama and narrative that it becomes accessible to “conscious” verbal formulation and potential modification in abstraction. Procedural knowledge is not representational, in its basic form. Knowing-how information generated in the course of exploratory activity, can nevertheless be transferred from individual to individual, in the social community, through means of imitation…Behaviour is imitated, then abstracted into play, formalized into drama and story, crystallized into myth and codified into religion-and only then criticized in philosophy, provided post-hoc, with rational underpinnings.” (ibid p. 78)

Peterson’s story of archetypes being passed on through behavioural patterns is presented without much in the way of evidence. Nonetheless, with his notion of archetypes as behavioural patterns that are passed down imitatively, Peterson has a theory of behaviour that underlies our linguistic productions. His theory is basically an enactivist-descriptivist story. He even goes as far as to argue that prior to the scientific revolution a few hundred years ago people engaged in their world pragmatically without using objectivist reference at all:

“The consequence of exploration that allows for emotional regulation (that generates security, essentially) is not objective description, as the scientist might have it, but categorisation of the implication of an unexpected occurrence for specification of means and ends. Such categorisation is what an object “is,” from the perspective of archaic affect and subjective experience. The orientating reflex, and the exploratory behaviour following its manifestation, also allows for the differentiation of the unknown into familiar categories of objective reality. However, this ability is a late development, emerging only four hundred-years ago, and cannot be considered basic to “thinking”. Specification of the collectively apprehensible sensory qualities of something-generally considered, in the modern world, as the essential description of reality-merely serves as an aid to the more fundamental process of evaluation, determining the precise nature of relevant or potentially relevant phenomena. (ibid p. 55)

In passage Peterson is noting that our interaction with objects in our world is primarily related to the emotional significance of the object not with the objective features of the object. Emotional associations with the objects we interact is the primary mode of thinking that governs our behaviour. He argues that understanding the objective features of objects beyond their emotional resonances is something we only achieved in the last few hundred years. Our primary experience of the world was through the emotional resonances the objects we engaged with.

Peterson’s historical understanding here is frankly bizarre. In the western philosophical tradition, ancient Philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle were practically obsessed with discovering what the underlying essence was of objects of our experience; that went beyond the accidental properties of the objects we discovered when we interacted with them. To deny that the primary mode of thinking in Philosophers such as Plato et al was to discover the objective properties of the objects of experience is to misunderstand the philosophical cannon entirely. In fact even pre-Socratic Philosophers such as Anixmendes were constructing scientific theories that attempted to map the objective features of reality. So Peterson’s take on the nature of reference is radically wrong from the point of view of the history of western thought.

An obvious rejoinder to what I have said is that even if Peterson is off by a couple of thousand years about when objective reference became important in human thought he is still correct that emotional engagement with objects radically precedes the human use of words for objective reference. I have some sympathy for this objection. The human species is well over three hundred thousand old so whether it began using objective reference consistently 300 years ago or 3000 years; isn’t really that important, as we are still talking about a blink of an eye from an evolutionary perspective.

While I agree that 3000 years ago is a blink of an eye from the perspective of the age of the species; Peterson doesn’t adopt this view. Typically Peterson argues that Christian myths represent universal patterns of human behaviour; yet Platonic Philosophy antedates Christianity by centuries. At the very least Peterson needs an argument if he wants to argue that Christian beliefs are fundamental patterns of human behaviour but Platonic thought is a late less fundamental add on.

But more importantly Peterson is underestimating how fundamental referential capacities are to linguistic usage. While Peterson is correct to note that our linguistic usage and behaviour is steeped in emotional resonances; nonetheless this is all anchored with perceptual apparatus designed to pick out mind independent objects. We saw above that naive referentialism is out as an explanation of linguistic meaning. Nonetheless, Peterson’s enactivism is ignoring work in neuroscience and developmental psychology which suggests that children are pick out key features of their environment prior to any interaction with these objects (see Carey 2009, Fodor and Pylyshyn 2015). Our referential apparatus are built up from cognitive structures called FINST (fingers of instantiation), which pick out objects in our environment independent of any other cognitive processes:

“One of the main characteristics of visual perception that led Pylyshyn (1989, 2001) to postulate FINSTs is that vision appears not only to pick out several individual objects automatically, but also to keep track of them as they move about unpredictably by using only spatio temporal information and ignoring visible properties of individual objects… Pylyshyn and his students demonstrated in hundreds of experiments (described in Pylyshyn 2001, 2003, 2007 and elsewhere), that observers could keep track of up to four or five moving objects without encoding any of their distinguishing properties (including their motion and the speed or direction of their movement.” (Fodor and Pylyshyn: ‘Mind’s Without Meanings pp. 100-102)

Thus the human brain is structured so that it can automatically lock onto key aspects of its environment, and reference is built up using this basic brain process. The existence of FINSTs doesn’t refute Peterson’s conception of semantics as FINSTs do require some causal interaction with the environment. But it does show that objective reference is not some Johnny come lately resulting from the invention of empirical science; rather it a key feature of the human brain shared by all humans since homo-sapiens evolved over three hundred thousand years ago.

Nonetheless while Peterson may go too far in the degree to which he underplays the importance of reference in human semantic affairs; he is surely right that our engagement with objects will have emotional resonances that we are not aware of.

When trying to justify his belief in the existence of universal archetypes Peterson, like Jung draws research into common themes in world literature. We will discuss these some of this literature in relation to the Banshee later in this blog-post.

Part 3: Dennett on the nature of Memes

As we discussed above archetypes are to some degree accepted by evolutionary psychologists as a way of explaining human behaviour and competences. But within some other types of evolutionary theorising about culture; a different (not necessarily incompatible) tool is used to explain human behaviour. I am of course referring to the concept of a meme coined by evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins in (1976), and later popularised by philosopher Dan Dennett (1991, 1995, 2017), and the psychologist Susan Blackmore (1999). The meme concept was developed on analogy with the gene. Just as the gene is a unit of information whose only “aim” is to replicate itself so a meme is a unit of information whose only “aim” is to replicate itself. The gene doesn’t care about the well being of the body it builds, and the meme doesn’t care about the behaviour it builds. Different genes build different bodies which compete for survival in cruel world of natural selection and the same is true of memes. Different memes build different behaviours which will either be successful in replicating the memes or won’t. From a “memes” eye point of view it is not important whether “memes” benefit the organism but whether the memes get themselves spread. In his recent book ‘From Bacteria to Bach and Back’ Dennett noted that memes are not instincts but are ways of behaving that are passed on perceptually. He noted that a paradigm type of meme is a word. Various words formed into sentences can infect us with ideas which will make us behave in various ways. Examples of memes could be religious texts, folk myths, etc. These memes could have deleterious effects on their hosts but as long as they are catchy they will be passed onto others and from a memes eye perspective will be considered fit. Memes are not limited to words. Accents that are mimicked are types of genes, so are styles of dress etc. Dennett lists three key aspects of memes: (1) competence without comprehension: Some cultural features may have what appear to be design features but they may not have an explicit designer. Think about ship designs which are partly designed by selection by the sea (bad designs won’t float). (2) Memes have fitness: As we saw above memes have their own reproductive fitness just like viruses. (3) Memes are informational things: They are prescriptions for ways of doing things that can be transmitted, stored, mutated etc (Dennett ‘From Bacteria to Bach and Back’ p. 221)

In his controversial ‘Consciousness Explained’ Dennett speculated that the self may be a centre of descriptive gravity which consists of memes that are only available to language ready creatures. On Dennett’s picture as different meme structures which we acquire from our environment compete for attention; our consciousness arrives when one of these informational hungry creatures temporarily wins the fame in the brain battle. Leaving aside the use Dennett makes of memes in his controversial theory of consciousness it is fair to say that a lot of evolutionary theorists find the use Dennett et al make of memes to be too superficial.

In the next section I will consider a famous Irish myth ‘The Banshee’ and discuss whether it is best thought of as a meme or an archetype. This is only a particular case study designed to test the explanatory depth of memes and archetypes on a limited cultural phenomena. In order decide between the relative uses of memes versus archetypes thousands of case studies like the one below are needed.

 

 

 

Part 4: The Banshee: an Irish Myth

The Banshee is an ancient Irish myth about a solitary woman who appears before a person’s death; she is usually noticed mournfully wailing outside of the house of the person who is about to die. She typically follows prominent groups of families; two famous families she followed was ‘the Mac’ family and ‘the O’ family (‘The Irish Death Messenger’ p. 55). The Banshee is typically heard (sometimes seen) by family members or neighbours of someone who is about to die. She virtually never appears to the person who is going to die. She typically appears near where the person who is going to die lives; perched on a nearby tree wailing sorrowfully.

The description of her wailing has been compared with the cry of a dog howling, and to the cry of a wild cat trying to attract a mate. However, people have noted that while there is a similarity between the cry of some animals and the Banshee; anyone who has heard the Banshee wail will easily be able to distinguish it from the cry of a mortal creature (ibid. p.73). Another common way of describing the cry of the Banshee was to compare it to the cry of professional keeners. A keening woman was a professional mourner whose job was to watch over and morn for the person who had died. Professional keeners were first noted in writing in the 16th century; however, it is believed the folk tradition of keening antedated these written records by centuries.

Descriptions of the Banshee were not always consistent. Sometimes, though rarely, she was described as a beautiful young woman with long golden hair, while more commonly she is described as a small old woman with long grey hair. One commonality in describing her is her non-erotic appearance; she is never associated with sexual activity (ibid p. 91)[5]. Most descriptions of her say that she was dressed in white clothes and held a comb[6] which she brushed through her long hair.

There were many different folk tales associated with the Banshee; two of which I will discuss below. The first tale involved a man walking home late at night. He sees the Banshee in the field combing her hair. He runs towards her and she drops her comb. He picks up the comb and runs home with it. He then went to bed and was awoken by her screams and the shaking of his house. He realises the Banshee is looking for her comb. He picks up the comb with a pair of metal coal thongs and uses the thong to put the comb on the window sill. The Banshee grabs the comb and he pulls the thongs back into the house. He looks at the thongs and realises that she has ripped off the metal head of the thongs.

In the second folk tale a man is walking home late at night and he sees a woman on a green flag that was outside his house. He approaches the woman (the banshee) and claps her on the back. She puts her hand on her head and lifts him clean off the ground and throws him to the ground. He escapes to his house and goes to sleep. When he wakes up his hair has turned white and the mark of her fingers are indented in his head.

The Origin of the Banshee Myth

The first written record of the Banshee is in an 8th century book called ‘The Cattle Raid of Froech’, which tells of a man called ‘Froech Mac Idaith’ who is wounded by a water monster. While his wounds are being attended to the sound of weeping are heard, and one hundred and fifty beautifully clad women are seen (ibid p. 193). A messenger is sent to ask the women why they weep and they say they are weeping for Froech. Froech is then brought to these women and they carry him away to the other world.

There are aspects of this story that aren’t consistent with the Banshee story; firstly the Banshee is solitary, and the wailing women in ‘The cattle raid of Froech’ are in a large group. Secondly one of the wailing women spoke while the Banshee is rarely described as someone who speaks. However, there is enough of a family resemblance between the wailing women and the Banshee to think that they are connected to the Banshee.

Another early written text which mentions a creature like the Banshee is ‘The Death of Cu Chulainn’. ‘The death of Cu Chulainn can be traced to the 8th century. In it Cu Chulainn is visited by a creature who appears to him in a variety of different shapes; a crow, a hag roasting dog meat, a young woman washing his spoils at a ford as he sets out for his final battle (ibid p. 198). Cu-Chulainn’s druid Cathfad says that the woman is ‘Badh’s daughter’ a creature who is foreboding his death by wailing and washing his spoils (ibid p. 198). Again this creature isn’t identical with the banshee (the banshee is only rarely described a young). But as a female creature who forebodes a person’s death by wailing she has enough of a family resemblance to the folk tale to be counted as an instance of the Banshee myth.

How far back the Banshee myth goes is impossible to say. In her ‘The Banshee’ Patricia Lysaght speculates that the Banshee may have evolved from an earlier myth:

It is tempting to see a connection between the banshee and her kin and a being met with in Old Norse tradition, the fylgja, whose very name who according to many scholars means ‘a follower’. One form of the fylgja is a female spirit who is connected with families and who sometimes appears at deaths but who has a wider function as a guardian spirit and carrier of the luck of the family, in particular of its head.” (ibid p. 55)

The earliest written records of the Banshee are from the eight century around the time the Vikings invaded Ireland. It is unknown whether the Banshee was independently invented in Ireland or if it was derived from Norse Mythology and was modified as a result of unique Irish traditions.

Banshee: As a Meme

The idea of a Banshee as a meme has a lot to recommend it. When we think of it as a mind virus competing for replication with a variety of other mind viruses we can make some sense of the development of the myth and the ultimate death of the myth. When discussing the evolution of Religion; Dennett notes that a key aspect of human psyche is an hair trigger agent detector. This agent detector plays a massive role in our survival as a species. Certainly the prehistory of our species involves the interpreting of pretty much all of nature interms of agency.

This agency detector is a key part of our folk-psychology we use to interpret the data of experience. It isn’t only humans that rely on such an agency detector in interpreting strange phenomena. Thus we often see the amusing spectacle of a dog growling at the wind as a result of confusing the noise of the wind as a potentially dangerous agent. Where the dog differs from the human is that he lacks language. Our human minds chock-a-block with concepts that we can combine in a potentially infinite manner gives a rich scope for judging the nature of the potential agent that startles us. Furthermore we can communicate our experiences and interpretations of our experiences with community and hence spreading memes comes natural to us. Whether the memes get spread or not will depend on the selective environment they are created in; in other words on whether their hosts prefer spreading them to spreading rival memes.

It is perfectly possible to imagine person hearing of the ancient Norse Legend of the Fylgja a Godess who sometimes appears at people’s death, and being fascinated by the myth. Suppose at some point he hears some strange animal noise that sounds like a woman weeping near a friend’s house and the next day by coincidence discovers that his friend has died. He may think back to the myth of the Fylgia godess who sometimes appears at people’s death. So he tells his friends that he heard the Flygja weeping prior to his friend’s death. Thus you have an interesting story that gets spread. Irish people of the time would associate women weeping at someone’s death with the professional keeners; who were typically little old women with grey hair. So the Flygja myth gets modified and instead of a Goddess it is an old woman wailing prior to the death of a member of the community.

Once the myth was retrofitted to suit the minds of a particular Irish community it would be a perfect mind virus that could spread around the country. Of course, in order for memes to spread they had to out compete their rivals, for every myth successfully spread there were plenty of other memes which they out competed. And this competition could be a factor in the death of the Banshee myth over the last hundred years[7], in the last century as travel between different cultures became easier, competition between myths would have been much higher, and stories which enthralled one generation seem dull to the next generation. Patricia Lysaght speculated on other factors that may have contributed to the death of the Banshee myth:

“Of more importance is the fact that increased literacy and greater availability of reading material- books, newspapers and magazines- gradually exposed larger and larger sectors of the population to ideas which would make the question their own values and beliefs…They were to be followed by the radio. Broadcasting started in Ireland in 1926…the old custom of visiting the neighbours at night- the rambling-was abandoned… the number of cars in Ireland increased from 19, 848 in 1925 to 711, 098 in 1984…As telephones became more common many visits which formerly involved being out after nightfall also became unnecessary. People did not need a death-messenger to inform their neighbours or absent family members or relatives of a death. They could be telephoned…the Rural Electrification scheme was initiated in 1947…Light from lampposts and other outside lights which had become increasingly common even in small villages and private house in the country, will no doubt have dispelled many an image, which might otherwise have impressed itself on the observer’s mind as a banshee or some supernatural being…In 1926 only 32% of the population of Ireland lived in towns and cities while the figure for 1981 was almost 56%” ( ibid pp.236-237)

The Banshee myth had a perfect ecological niche in isolate semi-literate communities, lacking in street light, electrified homes etc. However, the myth was less credible than its rivals in the new world and hence it died out. On this way of looking at things the Banshee is a paradigm meme which took hold at a particular time and place and gradually died out; it was a relatively successful meme but lacked the staying power of Christian myths.

One wonders how the myth was spread and taken seriously though. One guy may have heard the wailing noise and coincidently someone died the next day, but this coincidence wouldn’t have happened too often. However, there would be double motivation in people saying they saw the Banshee; one it gave you a kind of local notoriety. But more importantly the Banshee was alleged to only appear to people from important and truly Irish Families. So there would have been some motivation for people to say a Banshee wailed for the death of a loved one; it would have been a social signifier of importance. In this way along with the coincidence of a strange noise preceding a death you would have some families motivated to claim being visited by the Banshee. This would have helped the meme spread from village to village.

The stories around the Banshee also served an implicit moral purpose. All of the main legends around the Banshee involve men out late alone at night and approaching a woman in an inappropriate way. In each of the stories when the man approaches the woman there is typically a price to be paid. So the story may have been used as a way of protecting women from the advance of men late at night. Whether these stories were intentionally created to serve this purpose is difficult to say.

                                 The Banshee: A distorted Great Mother Archetype

As we saw above Peterson’s philosophy of language involves a pragmatic element which notes that we use language to cope with reality as opposed to represent it. For Peterson our language is shot through with metaphors; but he argues that there are central metaphors (archetypes) that structure our great myths:

“The mythological world- which is the world as drama, story, forum for action- appears to be composed of three constituent elements and a “forth” that precedes, and follows and surrounds these three” ( Maps of Meaning p. 105)

On Peterson’s view the three constituent elements are (1) The Great Mother, (2) The Great Father, (3)The Archetypal Hero. And these three constituent elements are surrounded by the great Dragon of Chaos. He justifies this analysis by a close reading some of the world’s great ancient myths. One myth that Peterson focuses a lot of attention on is: the ancient Babylonian Myth of the Enuma Elis. Peterson argues that the Goddess Tiamat is an archetype that represents the great mother. He describes the great mother as follows:

“The Great Mother-the unknown, as it manifests itself in experience- is the feminine deity who gives birth to and devours all. She is unpredictable as it is encountered, and is therefore characterized, simultaneously, by extreme positive and extreme negative valence…The domain of the unfamiliar might be considered the ultimate source of all things, since we generate all of our determinate knowledge as a consequence of exploring what we do not understand” (ibid pp.105-109)

There are elements of the Great Mother archetype that indicate a connection with the Banshee. The Banshee was more than likely derived from a feminine deity: the Fygja. Furthermore, the Banshee signals death, the ultimate unknown; which could be a derivation from the feminine symbol of the unknown: The Great Mother. When Peterson speaks of the negative aspects of the great unknown he does so in stark terms:

 “The great mother-unexplored territory- is the dark, the chaos of the night, the insect, ophidian and reptilian worlds, the damaged body, the mask of anger or terror: the entire panoply of fear-inducing experiences, commonly encountered (and imagined by Homo sapiens…The unknown is the matrix of everything, the source of all birth and the final place of rest. It hides behind our personal identity and our culture; it constantly engenders all that we do, all that we understand, and all that we are…The Great Mother, in her negative guise, is the force that induces the child to cry in the absence of her parents…She is everything that jumps in the night, that scratches and bites, that screeches and howls; she is paralyzing dismay, horror and the screams that accompany madness.” (ibid pp 157-163)

When the great mother is connected with the final place of rest and with howling and screeching one is immediately put in mind of the Banshee which may indicate archetypal origins.

But there is an aspect of the great mother that is missing in the Banshee Myth. The great mother isn’t just associated with death and fear; she is associated with creativity and birth. Creativity and birth are entirely missing from the Banshee Myth. In the archetypal myths the hero engages with the chaos of the great mother at great danger and as a result of dealing with the unknown in an appropriate way the hero emerges changed with new knowledge.

This aspect is entirely missing with the Banshee; encounters with the Banshee typically result in difficulties those who approach her. Encounters with the Banshee typically are warnings against approaching her in an inappropriate manner. This is consistent with Peterson’s reading of the great mother archetype:

“The Great and Terrible Mother, daughter of chaos, destroys those who approach her accidentally incautiously or with the inappropriate attitude, but showers upon those who love her (and who act appropriately) all good things.” (ibid p. 177)

However, encounters with the Banshee never offer exemplars of the great hero, approaching her and emerging changed and enhanced. In the original stories in the eight century the banshee was connected with great heroes like Cu Chulainn. However, as the myth developed the hero became less and less involved in the stories until he disappeared entirely.

On Peterson’s view the Banshee myth didn’t die out because of increased competition from competitors or because of technological advances but because the Banshee was a poor approximation of the archetype of the great Mother which had limited usefulness.

Conclusion

At this stage we can tell somewhat convincing stories that support interpreting the Banshee as a meme and as an archetype. Jordan Peterson has criticised memetic explanations as superficial explanations; however he hasn’t really presented much by way of convincing evidence for the existence of archetypes. Jung’s defences of archetypes rely heavily on sketchy ill worked out poverty of stimulus arguments, and muddled appeals to noble philosophical ancestry. While Peterson’s enactivist model with its emphasis on behavioural patterns learned imitatively isn’t sufficiently differentiated from memetic explanations. Furthermore, Peterson’s interpretations of the various worlds myths involve plausible sounding interpretations which are massively underdetermined by the data of experience (it is trivial to come up with countless alternative interpretations). While Dennett’s memetic explanation amounts to nothing more than an interesting just so story which it is impossible at present to test. In my next blog-post I will consider the myth of the Banshee from the point of view of evolutionary psychology and modern developmental psychology and we will see if we can come up with a more plausible account of the banshee myth.

[1][1] Jung also used psychotic fantasies and the associations of neurotic patients as poverty of stimulus arguments that the patients had evidence of ancient mythological themes which were also found in ancient texts of which the patients had never read or heard of.

[2] See linguist Dan Everett’s ‘Dark Matter of the Mind’ for a criticism of Plato’s argument as relying on leading questions so not really demonstrating anything about innate knowledge.

[3] I am running together a lot of theorists who disagreed with each other on a variety of different points. Fodor and Carey disagreed on the possibly of conceptual change, and Fodor and Pinker disagreed on the amount of concepts that were innate. I am just mentioning these thinkers because they offer possible avenues of support that Peterson strangely didn’t pursue; I am not implying that they make up a homogenous group.

[4] Peterson does discuss the work of Thomas Kuhn throughout the book. However, Kuhn was trained as a physicist and a historian and isn’t strictly speaking an analytic philosopher. Though Kuhn’s work is regularly taught and discussed in all philosophy of science classes. So perhaps he could be considered an honorary analytic philosopher.

[5] In a recent humorous short story by Blindboy she is depicted in a sexual manner. However, when discussing the Banshee we are concerned with the folk traditions surrounding her recent literary depictions of her.

[6] In costal parts of Ireland where there was a prominent myth about mermaids using combs the Banshee wasn’t described as using a comb.

[7] The Banshee myth hasn’t been taken seriously for over a hundred years in Ireland. There have been some films and short stories about the Banshee in the last couple of decades but they bear little relation to the original folk myth. Perhaps these new strands could be viewed as mutations that are striving to compete in a new environment in a way the original strand could not.

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Bertrand Russell’s Structural Realism

Russell the Naturalist Pioneer
Russell’s two books ‘The Analysis of Mind’ and ‘The Analysis of Matter’ are massively underrated philosophical texts. As philosophical folklore has it; Russell did brilliant technical work in philosophy between the years of 1903 and 1913 but peaked at that period. Under pressure from criticisms from his student; the young genius Ludwig Wittgenstein, Russell came to realise that he could no longer do serious technical philosophy. According to this philosophical mythology, from 1913 onward Russell worked primarily in the area of popular philosophy, and left real philosophy to the younger generation.
In Russell’s intellectual autobiography he notes that his last major philosophical work ‘Human Knowledge: It’s scope and Limits’ (1948) was viewed by younger philosophers as being merely a quaint outdated attempt at philosophy. In a similar vein, in his brilliant biography of Russell, Ray Monk paints a picture of a Russell post 1920 as out of touch with modern philosophy, engaging with debates with philosophers who were no longer at the cutting edge of the discipline. At the forefront of Monk’s characterisation is that Russell’s treatment of philosophical questions was wedded to an antiquated psychological interpretation of epistemology, while the younger generation of philosophers had moved beyond this approach. Logical Positivists, exemplified by Carnap and Wittgenstein were treating these questions as semantic questions that are best understood interms of logical analysis. On this picture, poor Russell was out of step with the younger generation of philosophers, he was a man of an earlier simpler time.
Monk is certainly correct in characterisation of the state of play for post 1920 Russell in relation to the cutting edge of philosophy of the time. Russell’s views were indeed considered quaint by the younger generation of philosophers. But time has a way of changing things. As every school child knows; Quine’s ‘Two Dogma’s of Empiricism’ cast serious doubts on the neat distinction between philosophy and science. Quine’s arguments convinced a majority of philosophers that the logical positivists attempt to make philosophy a discipline that is somehow outside our overall theory of the world and a judge of it, is unworkable. Quine argued plausibly, that we are all fallible humans with contingent theories about reality that we try to match to experience as best as possible. Quine (1969) convinced a lot of people that epistemology was a branch of empirical psychology, and that any metaphysics would have to be derived from studying the sciences in particular physics. Quine’s conception of philosophy isn’t universally accepted; but it think it is fair to say that it is close to being the standard position in philosophy, and certainly it has far more adherents than the views of the Logical Positivists . Philosophers today such as Noam Chomsky, Dan Dennett, the Churchlands, Don Ross, and James Ladyman are contemporary defenders a type of Quinean Naturalism. Furthermore, in a recent article Ray Monk has noted (somewhat hyperbolically) that Wittgenstein’s reputation amongst contemporary academic philosophers is sharply in decline (Monk ‘The Agony and the Destiny: Friedrich Nietzsche’s descent into Madness’ New Statesman).
Of course whether a majority of philosophers identify as naturalists of a Quinean sort proves very little. The truth of a proposition isn’t decided by a democratic vote. The majority of contemporary philosophers being Russelian naturalists, doesn’t vindicate Russell’s post 1920 turn. Nonetheless it does cast an interesting light on the typical narrative told about Russell. Far from being poor old Bertie who couldn’t keep up with modern trends of the younger philosophers; Russell can actually be considered a pioneer who was ahead of his time. Russell’s later philosophy prefigured Quine’s naturalism, and was arguably superior to Quine’s because Russell’s understanding of science was much deeper.
But narratives aside; it is important to evaluate Russell’s naturalistic conception of philosophy based on its empirical evidence and argumentative structure. Russell’s two books ‘The Analysis of Mind’, and ‘The Analysis of Matter’ were deeply steeped in the sciences of his day in particular behaviouristic psychology, relativity theory, and quantum mechanics. A central claim in both books was that there was a tension between the ontology suggested by both psychology and physics. The psychology of his time was primarily behaviouristic and suggested a picture of the world that was materialistic and mechanistic, while discoveries in physics, such as the general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics suggested a picture of the world that sounded less and less materialistic and mechanistic. Russell’s attempt to resolve these seemingly contradictory pictures was to explain both psychology and physics in terms of neutral monism. I have discussed Russell’s take on psychology in earlier blog-posts; in this post I will focus on his understanding of physics. While in my next blog post will be an overall consideration of Russell’s neutral monism.
The Child’s development of his intuitive concept of the physical
When analysing our conception of matter as revealed by discoveries in modern physics Russell sensibly begins with the ontogenesis of our conception of matter. His reasoning being that our intuitive conception of matter may influence scientific theorising on its nature. When discussing infant development Russell noted:
“In this primitive condition, the infant obviously has no conception of an “object.” An “object” for common sense, is something having a certain degree of permanence, and connected with several kinds of sensation… In infants, the most important factor in forming the common-sense notion of an object is the hand eye co-ordination, the discovery that it is possible, often, to grasp what is seen. In this way the visual and tactual spaces become correlated, which is one of the most important steps in the mental growth of an infant.” (ibid p. 143)
On Russell’s view the child begins with no conception of an object and gradually forms a concept of an object through a process linking sight with touch as the child moves about and explores the world. Russell’s picture of how the child develops the concept of an object is intuitively compelling and to some degree prefigures the work of the developmental psychologist Jean Piaget and naturalist philosopher Willard Quine. Up until the early seventies a majority of developmental psychologists would have agreed with Russell’s picture of how the child develops their concept of a physical object. Russell argued that:
“Common sense does not initially distinguish as sharply as civilized nations do between persons, animals and things.’’ (ibid p. 149)
Quine in his ‘Word and Object’ and Piaget in his ‘Principles of Genetic Epistemology’ would have found the above claim very congenial.
Since the early seventies, with the work of the developmental psychologist TGR Bower, a different picture has emerged. Piaget’s dim view of the human infant’s ability to form a concept of an object was based on the fact that children didn’t search for objects once they were placed outside of their field of vision. However, beginning with Bower, theorists began to speculate that the reason for infants didn’t search for missing objects, wasn’t because they lacked a concept of an object; but because of problems in coordinating motor movements. To overcome these difficulties researchers used a technique that involved scientists tracking the child’s attention. When children are viewing a scene after a time they become habituated to it, and spend less time studying the scene. Scientists took advantage of this fact and designed experiments where the infants were habituated to a particular scene and then something out of the ordinary happened. When this happened the child would stare longer at the scene; indicating that the infant was surprised by the new occurrence. Using techniques like these to track infant expectations of object behaviour, scientists determined that children have expectations of object permanency, of number (up to 4), contact mechanics, etc.
How to interpret these experiments is still being debated by scientists ( for a detailed discussion see my: https://addletonacademicpublishers.com/contents-lpi/759-volume-16-2017/2868-indeterminacy-of-translation-and-innate-concepts-a-critical-review ). A lot of the debate centres on whether the evidence which indicates that children have a concept of object as early as 6months old, is evidence that the concepts are innate. Whatever way one decides on this issue, the evidence does indicate that Russell’s views on the ontogenesis of the child’s concept of physical object are not correct. Children exhibit conceptual understanding of physical objects prior to them developing motor skills sufficient for them to coordinate touch with sight.
Nonetheless despite Russell being incorrect in his views on how the child develops her concept of an object; this doesn’t affect his overall philosophical position. Russell’s primary point when discussing how the child develops their concept of an object is to indicate that our intuitive conception of a physical object isn’t identical with our scientific understanding of the physical world.
The ontogenesis of our scientific conception of physical objects.
Russell’s discussion of the scientific conception of matter noted that from the beginning of the scientific revolution (roughly Galileo and Descartes time) the concept of matter was still closely related to our embodied experiences. He argued that our understanding of matter was derived from three bodily sources:
“We may perhaps distinguish three sorts of physics, in relation to the sense-experiences from which their ideas are derived: I will call them muscular physics, touch physics, and sight physics respectively. Of course no one of them has ever existed in isolation: actual physics has always been a mixture of the three…Broadly we may say that sight-physics has more and more predominated, and has achieved an almost complete victory over the others in the theory of relativity” (ibid p. 161)
As we discussed above Russell’s conception of how the child developed their concept of a physical object (through a combination of sight and touch) was incorrect, children have a pre-theoretical concept of an object prior to their development of motor skills. Given the incorrectness of Russell’s concept of how typical humans develop their ordinary language conception of an object, a critic may wonder whether this fact will effect Russell’s conception of how physicists developed their conception of a physical object. Russell’s emphasis touch-physics, and sight-physics etc may put critics in mind of his earlier conception of how the child develops his concept of an object. However, in the case of scientific conceptions of matter Russell justifies his claims in reference to facts about the history of science and hence his views aren’t refuted by facts about the ontogenesis of the child’s concept of an object. Nonetheless, it should be noted that human’s intuitive understanding of objects, may have influenced early scientific conceptions of physical objects in a way that Russell underestimated.
When discussing how our muscular physics influenced our early scientific conception of matter Russell explicated it in terms of Newton’s concept of force:
“Muscular physics is embodied in the idea of “force,” Newton evidently thought of force as a vera causa, not as a mere term in a mathematical equation. This was natural; we all know the experience of “exerting force,” and are aware that it is connected with setting bodies in motion. By a sort of unconscious animism, the physicist supposed that something analogous occurs whenever one body sets another in motion” (ibid p. 161)
Russell believed that touch-physics influenced early scientific conceptions of atoms engaging in a kind of contact mechanics analogous to billiard balls bashing off each other. One of the difficulties that Russell sees with touch physics is that relies on immediate contact with objects. Whereas sight-physics has been much more important in astronomy (ibid p. 164), as light waves can travel with little change through empty space, hence they put our senses in contact with objects incredibly far away. Russell argues that sight-physics is much more congenial with an event based ontology and that sight-physics is much more important than the other conceptions of matter.
The primary point of Russell’s discussion of the three different conceptions of matter is that our intuitive conception of matter is based on expectations derived from our senses of touch, sight and muscular tensions as we move about our world. Humans are in touch not with the objects we intuitively assume, but rather with sensible qualities which we use to infer common sense objects. Russell notes that the abstract notion of matter that is used in modern physics has little in common with our intuitive conceptions of objects that shaped early modern philosophy and science; nor is it identical with our sensory experiences. Our scientific conception of matter is almost entirely abstract and is very different from our sensory based conception of matter.

Russell’s structural conception of the physical

After outlining how we use our percepts to infer the world of commonsense objects and how these percepts influenced our early scientific understanding of matter; Russell then moved on to discuss matter in contemporary science. On Russell’s picture of the world once we move beyond stimulus to contemporary science , matter becomes entirely abstract and very different from the material objects assumed by common sense. Russell argues we should not think of the basic structure of reality as revealed by physics in terms of stuff or things. When one analyses the actual scientific data to deduce what it ontically commits us to, Russell argues, we discover that the science has no use for the notion of substance. Russell’s considerations of electrons and protons nicely illustrate his view on this topic:
“Are electrons and protons part of the ultimate stuff of the world, or are they groups of events, or causal laws of events? There may be a substance at the centre, but there can be no reason to think so, since the group of events will produce exactly the same percepts; therefore the substance at the centre, if there is one, is irrelevant to science, and belongs to the realm of mere abstract possibility. If we can reach the same conclusion as regards matter in physics, we have diminished the difficulty involved in building our bridge from perception to physics. The substitution of space-time for space and time had made it much more natural than formerly to conceive a piece of matter as a group of events. Physics starts, nowadays, from a four-dimensional manifold of events, not as formerly, from a temporal series of three-dimensional manifolds, connected with each other by the conception of matter in motion. Instead of a permanent piece of matter, we have now the conception of a “world-line,” which is a series of events connected with each other in a certain way. The parts of one light-ray are connected with each other in a manner which enables us to consider them as forming, together, one light-ray as a substance moving with the velocity of light. Just the same kind of connection may be held to constitute the unity of the electron. We have a series of events connected together by causal laws; these may be taken to be the electron, since anything further is a rash inference which is theoretically useless.” (ibid p. 244-245)
In the above quote Russell argues that science has shown that the postulate of matter (in the sense of substance) is superfluous and that we can account for the scientific data in terms of an event based ontology. In the particular case of electrons he notes that thinking of them as things held together by some substance is not warranted by the evidence. While there remains an abstract possibility that such a substance exists; from the point of view of science there is no reason to take this abstract possibility seriously.
Throughout his ‘The Analysis of Matter’ Russell vacillates between arguing that the notion of substance or thing-hood has no place in interpreting physics; and arguing that substance may play a role but we have no scientific way of studying it. Despite at one point arguing that agnosticism is the correct approach to the issue of substance (ibid p. 271), the overall tenor of the book is that once we move beyond our percepts our best theory of the physical world is an insubstantial one.
Russell’s argument is that our knowledge of the physical world is purely structural is based on the fact that we are not directly acquainted with the theoretical constructions used in modern physics. This argument is consistent with both the claim (1) we can only know structural features of reality because of our epistemic limits, but at metaphysical level there is more than structure to fundamental reality, (2) At an ultimate level there is nothing more to reality than the structures science discovers and we only think otherwise because we wrongly assume that reality must conform to our basic perceptual experience. But Russell in his ‘Analysis of Matter’ seemed assume that the second interpretation was the correct one.
In his 1928 paper “Mr Russell’s Causal Theory of Perception” M. H. A. Newman argued that Russell’s structuralist position resulted in a situation where we weren’t making discoveries in physics but were rather engaging in stipulations. In a letter which Russell wrote to Newman, Russell acknowledged the force of the criticism, and it’s devastating impact on his theory. Russell then argued that he had to some degree misspoke in his ‘Analysis of Matter’:
“…I had not really intended to say what I did say, that nothing is known about the physical world except its structure. I had always that there might be co-punctuality between percepts and non-percepts, and even that one could pass by a finite number of steps from one event to another compresent with it, and from one end of the universe to the other. And co-punctuality I regarded as a relation which might exist among percepts and is itself perceptible.” (Quote taken from Demopoulos and Friedman ‘Russell’s ‘The Analysis of Matter: Its Historical Context and Contemporary Interest’ p. 630)
In Russell’s above reply to Newman we can again see the ambivalence at the heart of Russell’s project. Russell never worked out the precise nature of his structuralism and what his structuralism meant for his neutral monism. In my next blog-post I will explore Russell’s neutral monism in relation to his overall views on the nature of mind and matter.

Psychological Influences on Russell’s Philosophical Positions

“Philosophy still has to learn that it is made by human beings and depends to an alarming degree on their psychic constitution. In the critical philosophy of the future there will be a chapter on ‘The Psychopathology of Philosophy’. Hegel is fit to bust with his presumption and vanity. Nietzsche drips with outraged sexuality, and so on. There is no thinking qua thinking, at times it is a pisspot of unconscious devils, just like any other function that lays claim to hegemony. Often what is thought is less important that who thinks it. But this is assiduously overlooked. Neurosis addles the brain of every philosopher because he is at odds with himself. His philosophy is nothing but a systematized struggle with his own uncertainty.” ( C.G. Jung 1943 Quote taken from Scharfstein ‘The Philosophers’ p. 377)

In my last piece I discussed Bertrand Russell’s strange views on mental imagery. How in some places Russell argued that he was an extremely poor mental imager; while his 1919 paper ‘On Propositions’, Russell argued that he knew from direct experience that mental imagery existed; and furthermore, real thinking would be impossible without the use of mental imagery. In a personal communication philosopher David Berman made a couple of comments which may be useful in helping further our understanding of Russell’s strange seemingly and contradictory views on mental imagery.
Berman works in the area of psychological philosophy and has developed a typology that he uses to help him understand the distinctive views held by the great philosophers throughout history. According to Berman there are two main types of philosopher (1) The Conscious type: Berkeley, Descartes, Socrates (2) The Material type: Hobbes, Spinoza, James. Berman also argues that there is a third though less fundamental type (3) The socio-linguistic type; Hegel, Russell, Rorty. He argues that some philosophers are a combination of types with one aspect or type being major and the other minor. Thus you can get philosophers who are a combination of the Consciousness Type and the Socio-linguistic type with the Socio-linguistic type being dominant or vice-versa. On Berman’s typology Bertrand Russell was Socio-linguistic thinker (major) and a material type (minor). I have discussed Berman’s typology in more detail in this blog-post https://wordpress.com/post/kingdablog.wordpress.com/10 .
In a general sense Berman justifies his typology by studying (1) Strong distinctive mental types living or dead, (2) his interviews with people who have distinctive mental types, eidetic imagers, people with Synesthesia, etc (3) detailed studying and reporting on his own introspective experiences, (4) detailed studies of the great philosophers texts and lives (Berman: Penult p. 5). General justifications aside we will now discuss how Berman deals with the specific case of Russell and how his typology relates to his philosophy.
In his ‘Manual of Experimental Philosophy’ Berman discussed a curious incident in Russell’s mental development. In his ‘Problems of Philosophy’ Russell argued that mental acts are directly observable and patently real. However, a few years later under the influence of James, Russell argued, not only that mental acts didn’t exist, but they were theoretical constructs not something we directly observe. This change of mind is frankly bizarre. It would be one thing if Russell, originally conceived of mental acts as a theoretical construct and later changed his mind, and argued that his philosophical position would be more parsimonious without the theoretical construct. But the fact that Russell originally argued that he could directly observe mental acts and later argued that we don’t observe them calls for an explanation. How could Russell be so sure that he observed mental acts in his earlier philosophy, and then later deny that he observed them?
Russell’s answer was that he was driven by a theoretical need to destroy idealism to postulate mental acts. On Russell’s account when he thought he was observing mental acts he was engaging in a form of wishful thinking. Using his typology Berman argues that Russell’s views on mental acts are evidence of the type of mind that Russell had. A person with vivid conscious experiences (someone like Descartes, Berkeley), would find it difficult to confuse a wish with something they directly introspectively experience because of their transparent access to their own conscious experiences. However, if according to Berman’s typology Russell is a socio-linguistic thinker who is excellent at thinking themselves into of the systems of philosophers; this would offer a compelling explanation of Russell’s strange views on mental acts. As a socio-linguistic thinker Russell’s direct experiences would be less direct than those of a type 1 or a type 2 thinker. Hence, for Russell when he claimed he was observing mental acts; presumably he meant observation in a less fundamental more theory laden manner than type 1 or type 2 thinkers would.
Berman’s typology could be used as a possible explanation of Russell’s strange views on mental imagery that we discussed in our last blog-post: https://wordpress.com/post/kingdablog.wordpress.com/305 . Again the fact that Russell argues in places that he is a poor mental-imager, and in other places argues that mental-imagery is indispensible for thinking could be evidence of the socio-linguistic nature of his thinking. Russell’s focus is so driven by conceptual concerns that he is unaware of how these conceptual arguments are undermined by his own reports of his experiences. I think that Berman’s typology goes some way towards explaining Russell’s seemingly contradictory views on the nature of mental imagery. However, as I noted in the last blog-post they don’t explain the nature of Russell’s reports of the emotional determinants of when he experiences mental imagery. So while I think that Berman’s typology is a useful partial explanation of Russell’s views I don’t think the typology goes far enough in helping us understand Russell’s claims. While most of the time Russell was the socio-linguistic thinker, that Berman describes, Russell had another side which he only became aware of from time to time. It was this side of him that he attempted to destroy with a cold rationality; he used this rationality try and contain his deep emotional experiences.
We saw above that Berman’s tripartite typology was a useful tool in helping us understand Russell’s philosophical claims about mental acts and mental imagery. Berman also uses another typology to help him understand different views held by the great philosophers. This typology distinguishes between philosophers who are primarily tactile thinkers (TT) or visual thinkers (VT). Berman argues that Russell is a TT and this fact influences Russell’s philosophical views on some subjects.
In his ‘Problems of Philosophy’, Russell famously analysed his experience of a table he was sitting on front of. Berman sensibly argues, that studying the nature of Russell’s description of his experience of the table, is an excellent way of discovering the type of mind Russell had.
In his problems of philosophy Russell had used various different intuition pumps to get his readers to note that they don’t directly perceive material things but rather we are directly acquainted with sense-data which we use to represent the material object. But Russell noted that despite his arguments showing that we don’t directly experience matter, people instinctively think they do experience matter. He locates this instinctive belief in the existence of matter in our sense of sight. Russell argues that as a result of our sense of sight we are led instinctively to believe that matter exists. Interestingly Russell doesn’t argue that our other senses e.g. touch lead us instinctively to believe in matter.
On Berman’s view when Russell claims that we instinctively believe in the existence of matter because of our sense of sight, and not because of our other senses; Russell is actually describing his own unique way of conceiving the world and isn’t picking out a universal trait shared by all humans.
In my previous blog-post I briefly discussed Russell’s claim that Bergson was a strong mental-imager. Russell had argued that both Watson and Bergson were building up their philosophies because of their idiosyncratic psychological capacities. However, Berman has noted that Russell’s views on Bergson’s capacity for Mental-Imagery were actually mistaken. In his Penult Berman cites the testimony of Bergson’s friend H-Wildon Carr:
“Anyone can who has the psychological habit of introspection can test for himself the prevailing character of his imagery and so can know whether he is or is not a visualizer, and if that is so I can settle the question finally so far as Bergson is concerned for I have learnt on his own authority that he is not” (Carr 1912 quote taken from Berman ‘Penult p. 73)
So according to Bergson himself he was a poor at forming mental imagery. So Russell’s conjecture about Bergson is directly contradicted by Bergson’s direct report of his own introspection. Furthermore in his Penult when he analysed Bergson in a similar manner to the way he analysed Russell; Berman claimed that Bergson was a tactile thinker. As Berman noted this discovery is a bit odd; as if Bergson and Russell were the same mental type then it is odd that they disagreed so violently about philosophy. To address this difficulty Berman appealed to his other typology of (1) Conscious Thinker, (2) Material Thinker, (3)Socio-linguistic thinker.
On Berman’s taxonomy both Bergson and Russell are tactile thinkers. However, On Berman’s taxonomy Russell’s major type was the socio-linguistic type. As we saw above the socio-linguistic type has less fundamental experiences and hence relies more on socio-linguistic understanding. Berman argues that because Russell was a Socio-linguistic thinker primarily and only secondarily a tactile thinker he relied more heavily on socio-linguistic knowledge than his own experiences in developing his own theory of the world. According to Berman, Bergson was primarily a tactile thinker, and developed his philosophy based on his direct experiences of reality. Hence, Berman has a justification based on his overall typology of why despite the fact Bergson and Russell were tactile types they ended up holding opposing philosophical views.
However, despite the plausibility of Berman’s claim that Russell was a socio-linguistic type, Berman went overboard in the level of superficiality he accused Russell of engaging as a result of his mental type. At one point in his Penult Berman accused Russell of bowing down to science when trying to do metaphysics. I think that this is grossly unfair. Russell did think that science was our best way of discovering the nature of reality but he never “bowed down” to science. Thus, for example while Russell did make use of behavioural science in his philosophy of language and mind. He was very critical of behavioural science on a number of grounds. Firstly, Russell was critical of Watson’s denial of the existence of mental imagery, Russell argued that it could be shown using the testimony of introspection that Mental Imagery existed. Secondly, Russell argued that basic facts from the science of perception and physics undermined the behaviourist’s claims to be making objective observations. Thirdly, while he thought behavioural science was of some use in epistemology, it didn’t have the conceptual resources to deal with some epistemic problems (such as the problem of the scepticism).
Furthermore, while Russell relied on physics in developing his metaphysical world views he was critical of some physicists interpretations of what science told us. Thus Russell argued that Eddington was badly wrong in claiming that science and religion were compatible. When it comes to the work Russell is most celebrated for his ‘Principles of Mathematics’, ‘Principia Mathematica’ and his ‘On Denoting’, Russell not only wasn’t bowing down to science, he was developing theories that went beyond any science of the time. The evidence from his critical engagement with behavioural science, his disputes with physicists like Eddington, and his own original philosophical contributions, are unambiguous refutations of Berman’s claims that Russell merely bowed down to science when engaging in philosophy.
However, even if Berman does go too far in his characterisation of Russell as bowing down to science when developing his metaphysics; he is surely correct in his assertion that Russell was primarily a socio-linguistic thinker. And Berman’s taxonomy divided into major and minor types does offer a partial explanation of why Bergson and Russell’s philosophies differed despite them both being tactile types.
As we discussed in my last blog-post, contingent facts about Russell’s life that were out of his control; such as the death of his parents when he was a child, and his being brought up by his puritanical grandmother, had a deep influence on his intellectual and emotional development. Such accidents of history and the philosopher’s defensive reactions to these experiences will influence their worked out philosophies as adults. For an example of emotions and their relation to a philosopher’s system see my blog-post on Quine and Emotions: https://wordpress.com/post/kingdablog.wordpress.com/228 . So while Berman is surely correct in emphasising differences in typology resulting in Bergson and Russell’s different philosophy; he is only telling half the story by neglecting contingent facts of life that may have played an even bigger role in the differences between their philosophies.
There have been some attempts to interpret philosophical systems in light of contingent facts about the life of a philosopher; thus in his ‘The Philosophers: Their Lives and the nature of their Thought’ Scharfstein discussed atomism as a philosophical doctrine. He noted that in ancient times the debate between atomists such as Democritus and their opponents were done at a time when we had a very poor scientific understanding of the nature of the world. Given the limited evidential basis informing the ancient discussions of the validity of atomism Scharfstein speculated that a major component in the position philosophers took in these debates was their concrete experience of reality .
Scharfstein didn’t just discuss atomism in relation to pre-scientific speculation about the nature of the physical world. He also discussed a peculiar form of atomism that has been prevalent amongst philosophers discussing their selves, their perceptions and the nature of their thought. In this case he also thought that discussions of the nature of the philosopher’s psychology would reveal why they were drawn to atomism:
“Therefore, when I think of the atomism of Hume, James, Russell, and Wittgenstein, I conclude that it must have been their inward experiences that made them receptive to the atomic disintegration of the self” (Scharfstein: ‘The Philosophers’ p. 77).
Scharfstein argued that the psychology underlying the atomism was informed by a deep depression suffered from all of these atomistic philosophers:
“Hume, James, Russell, and Wittgenstein were all undermined by suffering…underwent deep depressions, and all were tempted by suicide-Hume on only one occasion however. All four of these adopted approximately Buddhist solutions to the pains of life… Mach…was isolated, lonely and sensitive…like James, Russell, Hume, and Wittgenstein he adopted a near Buddhist solution.” (ibid p. 78)
Scharfstein’s analysis is interesting but he provides virtually no evidence to support his position. Obviously, undergoing great depressive periods isn’t sufficient to make one an atomist in the above sense. If it were then psychiatric wards would be full of people espousing atomistic philosophies. Furthermore, plenty of philosophers have suffered periods of depression and haven’t become atomistic philosophers; Schopenhauer is a notable example. Nonetheless despite the fact that Scharfstein’s analysis isn’t overly convincing it does remind us that contingent accidents life can play a role in the philosophy that a person adopts or creates. Bergson, and Russell may have both been tactile thinkers but they lived very different lives and had different aptitudes that may have lead them to adopting their different overall philosophies.
In my next blog-post I will flesh out Bergson and Russell’s philosophies and how it related to their lived experiences. I will then try to disambiguate the degree to which their typologies influenced their philosophical systems; and compare the influence of typology with the influence of accidents of their biography on their respective philosophies.

Bertrand Russell: Unconscious Terrors; Murder, Rage and Mental Imagery.

In his 1919 paper ‘On Propositions: What they are and how they mean’ Bertrand Russell attempted to solve a problem which had bothered him since 1903 but to which he could not find a solution. The problem which concerned Russell was called the problem of the unity of the proposition. Russell made various different attempts to solve this problem culminating in his 1913 ‘Theory of Judgement’ which was severely criticised by Wittgenstein and led to Russell abandoning his theory of judgement. Since his ‘Principles of Mathematics’ Russell had difficulties in accounting for the unity of the proposition. His technique of logical analysis involved him analysing propositions down to their basic atomic components. However, the problem was that once he did this he found it difficult to reconstruct the propositions in a way that had sense. If we take the proposition ‘The dog is bigger than the cat’, in the proposition one has two different nouns and a two place predicate. The problem is that if we treat the two place predicate ‘is bigger than’ and nouns ‘The dog’ and ‘The Cat’ as separate atoms, then we are left with the difficulty of how these atoms can be related to each other in a sensible manner. If we take the two nouns as separate atoms and the relational predicate as another atom; then the question becomes as to how the atoms are related together. If we say the relational predicate is related to the atoms by another relation we will go on an infinite regress of relations relating relations. But if we say that the relation intrinsically relates the two atoms we are pointing towards a mystery as opposed to solving it. Russell eventually decided that the atoms are related by a process of judgment by a subject. But he had intractable difficulties in explicating the nature of the subject or the nature of the atoms the subject was supposedly organising.
Around 1919, while in prison, Russell came to believe that solving the difficulty (which relates to symbolism) would of necessity involve psychological data. So Russell turned his attention to psychology. His primary area of interest was the behaviourism of J.B. Watson, however while Russell was impressed with Behavioural science, he found one major difficulty with it. Watson’s behaviourism involved denied that mental imagery existed and explained away mental imagery interms of muscular movements. Russell strongly disagreed with this approach:
“When Professor Watson says: “I should throw out imagery altogether and attempt to show that practically all natural thought goes on in terms of sensori-motor processes in the larynx (but not in terms of imageless thought”, he is it seems to me, mistaking a personal peculiarity for a universal human characteristic.” (Bertrand Russell ‘On Propositions’ p. 293)
Above Russell is criticising Watson for engaging in the typical mind fallacy when theorising about mental imagery. On Russell’s hypothesis; Watson has an inability to call up mental imagery and confusedly mistakes his inability as a universal trait shared by all humans. This inference of Watson’s is obviously an invalid one; and Russell cites the work of Francis Galton who demonstrated empirically that most humans were able to create mental imagery (though the degree to which they could do so varied).
Russell also noted that Galton’s study of mental imagery demonstrated that people’s ability to form mental images decreased as they got older. Russell speculated that perhaps Watson had lost the ability to form mental imagery through hard abstract work in behavioural science. This conjecture of Russell’s has been verified in a close scholarly study of Watson’s evolving views on mental imagery; ‘The First Modern Battle for Consciousness: J B Watson’s Rejection of Mental Imagery’ by Berman and Lyons. Through a close textual analysis of Watson’s writing throughout his career they demonstrated that early in his career Watson admitted to experiencing mental imagery while later in his career he claimed an inability to form mental imagery. Berman and Lyons argue convincingly that Watson’s change of mind resulted from him losing the ability to form mental imagery later in life. So Russell’s conjecture about Watson’s capacity to form mental imagery does seem to have been on the mark. Likewise Russell was surely correct to charge Watson with engaging with the typical mind fallacy.
Russell argued convincingly that the existence of mental imagery was a clear refutation of the type of behaviourism that Watson was endorsing. However, Russell made further uses of mental imagery in trying to solve the unity of the proposition which resulted in Russell having to incoherently attack his own ability to form judgements. When discussing the meaning of words Russell made the following point:
“So far we have found four ways of understanding words:
(1) On suitable occasions you use the word properly.
(2) When you hear it, you act appropriately.
(3) You associate the word with another word (say in a different language) which has the appropriate effect on behaviour.
(4) When the word is first being learned, you associate it with an object. The word ‘motor!’ can make you leap aside, just as motor can, but it cannot break your bones. ( Russell ‘On Propositions’ p. 301)

Russell’s account of the nature of words is thus far pretty comprehensive; and as he notes holds no difficulties for the behaviourist. But Russell argues that such usage of words is limited to what he calls demonstrative language; picking out and discussing objects in the immediate environment. Another important use of language is narrative use of language which involves telling someone about some remembered event. On Russell’s account a narrative use of language typically involves the formation of mental images in the speaker discussing the remembered event, and the formation of mental images in the mind of the person who listens to and understands what the speaker is saying. Russell notes:
“It is clear that, in so far as the child is genuinely remembering, he has a picture of the past occurrence, and the words are chosen so as to describe the picture; and in so far as the hearer is genuinely apprehending what is said, the hearer is acquiring a picture more or less like that of the child… it is nevertheless the possibility of a memory image in the child and an imagination image in the hearer that makes the essence of the ‘meaning’ of the words. In so far as this is absent, the words are mere counters, capable of meaning, but not at the moment possessing it. We may say that while, words used demonstratively describe and are intended to cause sensations, the same words used in narrative describe and are intended to cause images.” (Russell ‘On Propositions’ p. 302)

Based on the above line of reasoning Russell concludes that there are two other main ways that words can mean as well as the four mentioned above. (5) Words can be used to describe or recall a memory image, (6) Words can be used to describe or recall an imagination image. Russell notes that 5 and 6 are the essence of the meaning of words.
Russell uses such mental imagery in attempting to solve the problem of the unity of the proposition:
“I have a complex image, which we may analyse, for our purposes, into (a) the image of the window, (b) the image of the fire, (c) the relation that (a) is to the left of (b). The objective consists of the window and the fire with the very same relation between them. In such a case, the objective of a proposition consists of the meanings of its constituent images related (or not related, as the case may be) by the same relation as that which holds between the constituent images in the proposition. When the objective is that the same relation holds, the proposition is true; when the objective is that the same relation does not hold, the proposition is false.” (Russell ‘On Propositions’ pp. 316-318)

Russell’s attempted solution to the problem of the unity of the proposition involves the postulation of mental imagery. Likewise he argues that mental imagery is the essence of the meaning of words in most cases. This position raises a number of difficulties for Russell. As we saw above Russell argued that Watson didn’t have the ability to form mental imagery. But if we assume with Russell that Watson didn’t have the capacity to form mental imagery then this raises questions with Russell’s theory of meaning. Watson is perfectly capable of reasoning verbally about things in the past and things in the future. Russell respected Watson enough to ask him to read and comment on his ‘Analysis of Mind’. In practice Russell acted as though Watson was a thinker who was capable of meaning things by his words. Yet on Russell’s theory; he should have judged Watson’s speech which didn’t involve mental imagery as follows:
“it is nevertheless the possibility of a memory image in the child and an imagination image in the hearer that makes the essence of the ‘meaning’ of the words. In so far as this is absent, the words are mere counters, capable of meaning, but not at the moment possessing it.” (ibid p. 302)

If Russell was true to his word he should have judged a non-imager like Watson’s speech as a meaningless counter. That Russell didn’t adopt this extreme approach in interpreting the verbal utterances of Watson is evidence that Russell didn’t fully endorse his theory in practice.
But things get much worse for Russell’s theory when consider how he uses it to deal with the problem of the unity of the proposition. On Russell’s view our mental imagery of a state of affairs is true when the imagery is isomorphic with the state of affairs it depicts and false when it isn’t. Russell thinks this isomorphism between our mental images and the reality it depicts solves the unity of the proposition problem. But we saw earlier that Russell argued that Watson was incapable of forming mental imagery. Based on this fact Russell would have to conclude that Watson was incapable of judging statements such as ‘the cat is on the mat’. This is a fantastical result.
However things get even more fantastical when we consider what Russell said about his own mental imagery. In his ‘Philosophy of Logical Atomism’ written the year before his paper on Propositions Russell made the following claim:
“That, of course, is especially likely in very abstract studies such as philosophical logic, because the subject-matter that you are supposed to be thinking of is so exceedingly difficult and elusive that any person who has ever tried to think about it knows you do not think about it except perhaps once in six months for half a minute. The rest of the time you think about the symbols, because they are tangible, but the thing you are supposed to be thinking about is fearfully difficult and one does not often manage to think about it. The really good philosopher does once in six months think about it for a minute. Bad philosophers never do.” (Bertrand Russell ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism’ p. 185)
Above Russell argues that the philosopher (including Russell) when thinking about abstract matters in logic can rarely get to the thing itself and instead has to think purely in symbols. Yet in his ‘On Propositions’ written less than a year later Russell argues that when a person is thinking in symbols they are using counters, capable of meaning but without imagery devoid of meaning. This would mean that Russell only thinks meaningfully only once every six months for a half a minute.
Of course a defender of Russell could argue that he is in the above quote talking about one of the most difficult subjects known to man and that when it comes to more prosaic subjects he can think in images for a much longer period. But even this defence of Russell doesn’t fit with the facts we know about his intellectual capacities.
In his masterful biography of Russell Ray Monk noted that Russell read Williams James’s Principles of Psychology and found James’s account of people having different capacities to form Mental Imagery fascinating. In a section where James discussed Galton’s breakfast table test; James noted:
An exceptionally intelligent friend informs me that he can frame no image whatever of the appearance of his breakfast-table…the ‘mind-stuff of which this ‘knowing’ is made seems to be verbal images exclusively.
In the margins where Russell wrote about the above example, he noted ‘this is almost my own case’ (ibid p. 86). Furthermore when Russell was psychologically tested by Crawshay-Williams, the results indicated that Russell was primarily a verbal thinker.
It is both fascinating and strange that Russell who by his own acknowledgement (and according to a psychologist who tested him), was a poor Visual Imager; would construct a theory of judgement that meant he was virtually incapable of forming any judgements. The examples, Russell gave of using imagery that were isomorphic to mind independent facts seem to be the very facts he would be incapable of forming. So, for example, if he were incapable of forming an image of his breakfast table he couldn’t judge whether the salt was to the right of his cup of tea. He could use verbal reasoning to make this judgement but according to Russell this type of judgment wouldn’t be an example of real thinking.
The question which now needs to be asked is why would Russell sketch a theory of thinking that implied that he could rarely think? Russell’s reliance on imagery becomes even more strange when one thinks on the philosopher who Russell spent a lot of his time criticising; Henry Bergson. After meeting and talking with Bergson; Russell made the following comment:
“I didn’t find out anything except, even more strongly, what one gathers from his books, that he is a very vivid visualiser, but has little auditory or tactile imagination-his whole philosophy is dominated by a sense of sight” (ibid p. 239)
It is surprising to find that Russell’s theory in ‘On Propositions’ results in a state of affairs where Russell is arguing that Bergson, (who he strongly disagrees with) is capable of meaning; whereas Russell most of the time is just using counters and not thinking.
It is difficult to understand what could lead Russell to advocate a view made meaning so parasitic on something Russell claimed to be incapable of. Could Russell really think that he wasn’t meaning anything when he spoke?
Strangely enough; there is a sense in which Russell did take his public utterances to be somewhat meaningless. Russell’s childhood was tragic. At the age of two his mother and sister died. His father died a year later. Russell was then brought up by his grandparents. After his grandfather died and his brother was sent off to boarding school Russell was brought up at home by his puritanical grandmother. Russell learned early to form polite chat at home with his grandmother and to keep his real thoughts and feelings to himself. Later on in life when he was informed about psychosis being a major factor in his family he came to associate these thoughts and feelings with fears of going insane.
Nonetheless, despite outward appearances Russell had a rich fantasy life and felt resentful at his grandmother and his life in general. Throughout his life he would swing between finding people he believed could penetrate to the true him; artists like Joseph Conrad and D. H. Lawrence or his lover Lady Ottoline, to disenchantment when relations strained with these muses. When this happened Russell would throw himself into his mathematical logic and regressed to the way of acting he maintained with his grandmother:
“Everything vital and important to him was kept hidden behind a polite, stiff and priggish exterior” (Monk ‘Russell p. 158)
“And, just as he had then, so he now tried desperately ‘to avoid all deep emotion’ and to live once more on the surface” (ibid p.305)
But what is the nature of this self, he believed, these artists grasped about him? When discussing his bond with Conrad; Russell noted:
“It had to do with our shared ‘Satanic Mysticism’, the truth of which he had never been convinced about, but ‘in moments of intense emotion it overwhelms me.’ It consists in thinking there are two levels: ‘one of science and common sense, and another, terrifying, subterranean and periodic, which in some sense held more truth than the everyday view.” (ibid p. 317)
So for Russell at some level; the subterranean depths were more real than the level of science and common sense. But what did these subterranean depths consist of? A further discussion of Russell’s capacity for mental imagery is revealing.
Despite what we discussed above; Russell could form some mental imagery. While living abroad and away from his girlfriend he commented in a letter that:
“I have lost the power of visualising thee, which I only keep a few days of parting” (ibid p. 87)
So when it came to someone he was emotionally and sexually attached to he could form mental images. Furthermore, and more disturbingly, when noting his violent tendencies he also noted that these violent thoughts gave him burning hot imagery:
“I remember when I wanted to commit murder, the beginning was a sudden picture (I hardly have pictures at ordinary times) of a certain way of doing it, quite vivid, with the act visible before my eyes. It lived with me then for ever so long, always haunting me; I took to reading about murders and thinking about them, and always with that picture before me. It was only hard thinking that kept me straight at the time- the impulse was not amenable to morals, but it was amenable to reasoning that this was madness.” (ibid p. 256)
So with someone he cared deeply about he could form some mental imagery even if he couldn’t maintain the imagery for long without contact with that person. His imagery improved as we saw when he was highly emotional; for example in the disturbing example of his fantasies of murder. However, he didn’t always need to be strongly aroused by love or hate to form mental images:
“Bates bores me while I am reading him, but leaves pictures in my mind which I am glad of afterwards.” (ibid p.529)
But in again his forming images is related to reading fiction. For Russell, mental imagery is restricted to lovers, hated people he thinks violent thoughts about, and to the realm of fiction. In other words, for Russell mental images are primarily the realm of fantasy. Yet in his paper in propositions he thinks that the essence of thinking is in images. He goes as far as to say that true thinking cannot occur without such images.
It is a reasonable conjecture that Russell growing up in Victorian society with a puritanical grandmother taking care of him, resulted in him hiding all his passions and bad thoughts from public consumption; even from himself at times. But at an unconscious level he always thought that this hidden self was his real self (as opposed to a just another aspect of his evolving personality). Russell was terrified that at his core he had inherited insanity from his family. His sometimes violent fantasies became associated with this madness and these fantasies, typically accompanied by imagery, became associated with what he unconsciously believed was the truth. His public philosophy which he constructed without mental imagery became unconsciously associated with a meaningless facade.
It is my contention that Russell’s ‘On Propositions’ was an unconscious confession that his public philosophy was a meaningless facade, and that his true nature was the self revealed in his intense imagery of lovers, enemies, fiction and madness itself.

What is Truth? Part 1: Correspondence.

 

When trying to elucidate is the nature of truth; it is best to start with our intuitive conception of the concept, and see whether it stands up to critical scrutiny. Most people uncontaminated by philosophy would cash out truth as in terms of correspondence. The correspondence they would try to elucidate would be between either a thought or a statement and a state of affairs in the world. On this picture something is true if and only if the statement/thought corresponds with a state of affairs in the world.

 

            When trying to elucidate this correspondence theory of truth it is important to do so in reference to a series of examples. Some examples seem to perfectly fit the correspondence theory of truth, while other examples are more problematic. A nice clear example which seems to fit the correspondence theory of truth is the statement (1) Grass is Green. Statement (1) is true if grass is green and false if it is not. The true statement results from a correspondence between a fact and the state of affairs in the world that the statement represents. On the face of it (1) is a perfect example of a correspondence between a statement and a state of affairs in the world; hence it is a nice illustration of a particular instance of the correspondence theory of truth that we can use to see if it generalises to all supposed true statements.

 

            Obviously, however, before we proceed to test whether we can generalize from example (1) to other examples of true statements we need to first analyse the nature of the purported correspondence occurring with example (1). Now if we are arguing that the statement corresponds with a state of affairs in the world we are committed to the view that words in the sentence correspond to objects or properties in the world and that the structural features of the sentence are isomorphic with the structural features of the world.

 

            If we begin with first with structural features of our statement (1) Grass is green. On the face of it (1) involves picking out an object (grass) and predicating to the object the property of greenness. If the statement is true the then the object picked out by the statement (grass), will in fact be green hence the statement will correspond with a state of affairs in the world. Other structural variants of the sentence would be nonsensical as they wouldn’t pick out any sensible structural features of the world. Thus take (2) Is grass green. There are various different ways of interpreting (2) the most obvious one being that by moving ‘is’ to the front of the sentence (2) unlike (1) is no longer a statement but a question. On this plausible interpretation; a simple structural change to the sentence stops it from being a statement. Another possible structural change is illustrated by (3) Green is grass. Now (3) from a structural point of view is a statement. However, on the face of it, the statement seems to be senseless. There are various different ways of parsing the statement one could read it as treating ‘Green’ as an object and predicating ‘grassness’ as a property of the ‘green’. But the preceding interpretation seems barely intelligible. There are other ways of treating (3) a more plausible way of interpreting it would involve pragmatic features that would mean that green is understood in terms of a particular paradigm; ‘grass’. However, while a theory of linguistic usage of this form could be sketched it would involve considerations that would go well beyond any simple sketch of the truth of the statement being simply a correspondence with non-linguistic facts.

 

            So it could be argued that (1) is the only structural combination of the three words ‘grass’, ‘is’, and ‘green’ that makes sense as a statement; and this is because the structural features of (1) directly mirror the structural features of the world. So in the simple example of (1) we need to posit a kind of structural isomorphism between the sentence and the state of affairs in the world it picks out.

 

            This account of a mirroring relation between sentences and the states of affairs in the world they pick out works well for a variety of different sentences. A sentence such as (5) The cat is on the mat. Is a perfect exemplar of a statement having structural features in common with states of affairs in the world. The examples I have given are extremely simple ones, and obviously any attempt to generalize the structural isomorphism between syntax and structural features of reality in true sentences will raise a lot of technical difficulties when discussing more complex syntactic structures. However, for now, let us stick with our simple example (1) and discuss it in relation to relation to the semantic features of the sentence; what sense we can make of explicating the truth of the sentence in terms of correspondence.

 

            As I said above (1) would be a clear example of a true sentence for a person uncontaminated by philosophy. It is a reasonable conjecture that most people would think that (1) is true because it corresponds with a particular state of affairs in the world. Of course a moment of reflection will show that things are not as simple as they seem. Firstly, statement (1) ‘Grass is green.’ is a general statement, so its truth value cannot be cashed out by a single state of affairs. In (1) the word ‘Grass’ isn’t being used to pick out a particular blade of grass. Nor is ‘Grass’ being used to pick out a particular patch of grass. In (1) ‘Grass’ is being used to pick out a particular category of things in the world that we use the label ‘Grass’ to describe. When it comes to ‘Green’ it isn’t referring to a particular green thing in the world; rather it is describing a property which different things in the world have or don’t have. The word ‘is’ should be treated as a relational predicate that links the property with the object in the sentence.

 

            With the above little bit of complexity acknowledged we can no longer simply assert that (1) is true because it corresponds with a particular state of affairs in the world. If we consider ‘Grass’ as a general term that picks out a type of entity in the world, and not a particular entity, then our analysis becomes more complex. When we are speaking of what a word refers to we run the risk of presenting a misleading picture of what reference entails. As has long been noted in the philosophical literature (see Strawson 1971), words don’t refer; rather words are used by people to refer to things. So when we are discussing a reference relation between a word and an object in the world we need to keep in mind the context the word is used in.

 

            In trying to understand the reference of the word grass ‘Grass’, we will obviously need to have a theory as to the nature of reference. When thinking about reference it is best to begin with concrete acts of reference in a shared world of experience; and building up a theory of how we refer to abstract entities such as numbers, sets, etc. after we have accounted for simpler forms of reference.

 

            Reference is typically a social skill and involves communication between at least two parties about a shared world of experience[1]. Reference is possible without linguistic communication. A non-linguistic example of reference is pointing. The ability to interpret pointing is a human universal[2], but it is not shared by most other animals. Non-human primates, don’t use pointing as a tool to refer to the non-human world. In fact few animals are proficient at interpreting pointing. An exception to the rule that most non-human animals have trouble interpreting pointing; is domestic dogs. Wolves who domestic dogs evolved from cannot typically interpret pointing; but domestic dogs have somehow evolved the skill. Domestic dogs were primarily selected for by humans for their social abilities. It is probably no coincidence that domestic dogs who were selected for empathy with the humans they live with, have developed the capacity to interpret human gaze direction and pointing. However, an analysis of the evolution of domestic dog’s capacity to interpret gaze direction and pointing is beyond the scope of this paper.

 

            Normally developing humans have the capacity to interpret the eye gaze of their fellow humans as directed towards objects in their shared environment, and to interpret our fellow humans pointing as referring to objects in our shared environments. In order to interpret eye gaze or pointing as indicating an object in a shared world of experience a creature needs what anthropologist Tomasello calls shared intentionality. At a minimum the humans need to view each other as agents with a point of view about the world and as agents who may want to communicate useful information about the world to another agent.

 

            Animals who have the capacity for shared intentionality and the capacity to interpret eye gaze, and pointing; have the rudiments of reference in place. They can refer to objects in the mind independent world and can judge whether the person they are communicating is interpreting the reference correctly or not. So we can now see that with triangulation on a shared object of experience, comes the capacity for reference, and for correct or incorrect interpretations (Davidson 2001). Furthermore, the ability to use words, though more complex than bare pointing, still relies heavily on the foundation of shared intentionality and pointing. 

 

            So with two primitive humans who are interacting with each other in a particular environment; if one human points to grass in the environment, the other human can judge, either correctly or incorrectly, that that is what his partner was referring to. Of course without the linguistic abilities these creatures will remain at a primitive stage of communication and they won’t have the capacity to make statements about the aspect of reality they are referring to.

 

            In the philosophy of language there is a debate in the theory of meaning that is divided into two main camps: the descriptive theory of meaning (Frege, Russell, the Later Wittgenstein), and the direct reference theory of meaning (Kripke, Putnam). Roughly speaking the descriptive theory of meaning argues that our words manage to refer by picking out an object in the world via a description (or a cluster of descriptions). While the direct reference theorist argues that we pick out objects directly and our words keep their meaning by tracking the same object throughout time.

 

            The debate between descriptive theorists and direct reference theorists is at an impasse and at the moment amounts to nothing more than an appeal to competing intuitions. However there has been some excellent work in perceptual psychology and philosophy (see Fodor and Pylyshyn 2013) has provided a good perceptual grounding for direct reference theorists[3]. In this piece I am going to work within a direct reference theory of meaning and causal theory of meaning. Though given that the debate between descriptive theories of meaning and direct reference theorists hasn’t been decided any conclusions I make will be vulnerable to the outcome of this debate on the theory of meaning. Such is life.

 

            So in our (very) conjectural story truth enters the scene with triangulation on shared objects of experience between agents communicating with each other and judging whether the other has interpreted the others pointing correctly or not[4]. Our similar perceptual apparatus, and similar embodied nature, as well as our emphatic understanding of each other[5] makes this triangulation mostly successful.

 

            In going from triangulation using pointing and eye gaze to the use of words and the combining of these words with syntax we move into deep waters. In studies of the evolution of language there is lots of data and competing theories but no theory which stands out as the obviously correct one. Tomasello argues that language evolved from gestures and that spoken words came later. Everett argues that speech and gesture evolved together. While Chomsky almost entirely ignores gesture and traces the origins of language to a mutation which gave us syntactic structure. The dates of when language evolved are again radically different depending on the theorist; Everett places the evolution of language at about 1.5 million years ago, Tomasello argues that it evolved 200,000 years ago, while Chomsky argues that language evolved 50,000 years ago because of a random mutation.

 

            Obviously any discussion of how language evolved cannot be undertaken in this paper, as to discuss the issue in the detail, would require at least a book length treatment. And as our topic here is on the nature of truth and not the evolution of language we need to keep our focus on the salient issues and avoid getting bogged down into a morass of irrelevant detail.

 

            For our purposes we need only note that the next step that our primitive human must make beyond pointing; is to be able to pick out an object, and say something about it. This would involve our primitive man developing subject predicate structure. So for simplicity sake let us pretend that our primitive man is speaking proto-English. He can point to objects, can name the objects and say things about them. At this point our primitive man will have the capacity to say ‘Grass is green’ and the members of his tribe will be able to judge whether what he has said was correct or incorrect.

 

            Based on our causal theory of meaning we will assume that grass was originally picked out because of its bare perceptual features and given a name which was passed on to other members of the community. In this sense grass will have an extension that is recognised by most members of the community; based on the perceptual features of the environment. Presumably one of the key perceptual features of grass as-well as its shape will be its colour. So it will be partly built into the concept of grass that it is green. So most people who understand the concept of grass will agree that it is green; it will be part of the concept of grass that it is green.

 

            However, despite the fact that greenness will be one of the perceptual features used to pick out grass, it would be a mistake to assume that the greenness of grass is a conceptual truth. It is an obvious fact of experience that grass isn’t always green. During hot weather grass can turn brown and yellow. The greenness of grass may be a typical perceptual feature of grass but something can be grass and not be green.

 

            So when the general statement (1) “Grass is green” is asserted; the response won’t be true of false but rather a sensible person will reply that it is typically green though not always. The preceding response won’t rely on a simple correspondence between a statement and a state of affairs but will rather involve an averaging many perceptual experiences.

 

            Above we were speaking about a person who was answering the question based on their own casual experiences interacting with the world on a daily basis. However it is important to note that we have more precise ways of classifying the world and the entities it contains; than casual induction. Scientific analyses often categorise things in more precise ways than our ordinary perceptual judgements do. So, for example, while people may classify Whales as Fish, or the Moon as a Planet, scientific analysis divided up the world in a more precise manner using an intricate network of theory. Hillary Putnam calls this the division of linguistic labour where we use our concepts based on loose perceptual features but rely on scientific analysis to give the extensions of our concepts in a more finely grained manner. However, when it comes to a scientific analysis of something like grass, simple correspondence between statement and fact becomes less plausible. A scientific theory is a interconnected network of theoretical and empirical facts which are used to predict and control the data of experience. A scientific analysis of something like grass will not involve a simple statement that corresponds with non-linguistic facts; rather it will be a network of statements that are connected to experience only at the periphery (Quine 1951).

 

            We saw above that our ordinary language interpretation of (1) “Grass is green”, doesn’t yield to an unproblematic correspondence between statement and fact. Neither do we get an unproblematic correspondence between statement and fact when we resort to a scientific interpretation of (1). However it could be argued that (1) would yield to an unproblematic correspondence if we add the demonstrative ‘this’ to (1) to yield (6) This grass is green.

 

            The use of the demonstrative ‘this’ in (6) seems to give us a simple correspondence between statement and mind independent fact. We no longer have to worry about yellow grass and we can simply assert correctly that the grass in front of us is green. However, even here we run into some problems when we try to cash out the statement in terms of correspondence with mind independent fact. As it is unclear that green is in fact a property that exists in the mind independent world.

 

            As every school child knows, the standard scientific theory of colours are that they are a secondary quality that are created as a result of light reflecting off objects and hitting our retinas, resulting in information being translated along our neurons until the hit the occipital lobe in our brains, which results (nobody knows how) in our conscious experience of colour. So it is unclear whether we can cash out the greenness of grass in terms of simple correspondence with mind independent facts[6]. So even with the simple sentences like “This grass is green” cannot be explicated in terms of simple correspondence between statement and fact.

 

            It could be argued that I am by focusing on a secondary quality like colour I am making things too hard for those who are pushing for a correspondence theory of truth. However, this interpretation is incorrect. As Berkeley showed three hundred years ago even primary qualities don’t yield unproblematic access to a mind independent world.

 

            In this piece I tried to begin with a simple statement and explicate it in terms of a correspondence theory of truth. My plan was to begin with a simple statement demonstrate the correspondence there before moving on to more complex statements. However, I discovered that even with the simple statements an analysis in terms of correspondence proved impossible. There no generalisation from simple statements to more complex statements was possible. In the next blog-post I will discuss the coherence theory of truth and see if it fares any better as a theory than the correspondence theory did.

 


[1] See Davidson ‘What Thought Requires’ 

[2] By a human universal I mean that the skill of interpreting pointing is shared by all normal humans; some humans with autism or various different types of intellectual disabilities have trouble interpreting pointing.

[3] Though there are some dissenting voices see Churchland 2013 and Burge 2007.

[4] This picture was first argued for by the philosopher Donald Davidson…Though Davidson was pretty sketchy on the nature of the cognitive architecture responsible for this capacity. Michael Tomasello, more than any other, theorist has helped us fill in the empirical details missing from Davidson’s logical reconstructions.

[5] For a discussion of empathy see Quine 1990.

[6] Some philosophers and scientists reject the division of the world into primary and secondary qualities, for example Daniel Dennett, and some direct realists about colour. However their position is a minority one and as far as I am aware no direct realist has any account for how the mind manages to remain in direct contact with the mind independent world.

 

Edward Witten, New Mysterianism, and Physics Worship

INTRODUCTION
“Incurable optimist that I am, I find this recent invasion by physicists into the domains of cognitive neuroscience to be a cloud with a silver lining: for the first time in my professional life, an interloping discipline beats out philosophy for the prize of combining arrogance with ignorance about the field being invaded. Neuroscientists and psychologists who used to stare glassy-eyed and uncomprehending at philosophers arguing about the fine points of supervenience and intensionality-with –an-s now have to contend in a similar spirit with the arcane of quantum entanganglement and Bose-Einstein condensates. It is tempting to suppose that as it has become harder and harder to make progress in physics, some physicists have sought greener pastures where they can speculate with even less fear of experimental recalcitrance of clear contradiction.” (Dennett ‘Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Objections to a Science of Consciousness’ p. 10)
In this blog-post I will evaluate physicist Edward Witten’s claim that consciousness will remain a permanent mystery that science will never reduce to basic physics. In the first half of the blog-post I will evaluate Witten’s argument (such as it is), and criticise his view as lacking in sufficient justification. I will discuss why people seem so impressed by Witten’s claim despite the lack of evidence presented by him. In the second half of the blog-post I will attempt to present a philosophical justification for why Witten may hold the views on the mind that he does and show that a possible argument for his position is constructible but that Witten hasn’t presented this argument himself.
Part 1: An evaluation of Witten’s “argument” for the non-reducibility of consciousness to physics.
A little over two years ago Edward Witten declared in an interview that consciousness would more than likely forever remain a mystery which science couldn’t explain. Witten’s entire argument went as follows: Future Science will make great progress in giving functional explanations of how the brain is implemented in causing consciousness. However, it is unlikely that future science will ever get a handle in explaining why consciousness has the form that it does. Witten says he finds it inconceivable that future science will ever explain the hard problem of consciousness. He went on to speculate that he believed that science is more likely to explain the nature of big bang than it is to solve the hard-problem of consciousness.
On the face of it Witten hasn’t said anything particularly controversial. Most theorists working on consciousness are aware of the so-called hard problem of consciousness and there are various competing approaches to deal with the problem. What is surprising though is that people found Witten’s speculations particularly interesting. Given that Witten didn’t provide a single piece of evidence to support his claim, but simply asserted that he personally didn’t think there would be any progress in a field he doesn’t work in, one would imagine that his speculations would have evinced a shrug of the shoulders. But no his speculations made news. Scientific American writer John Horgan wrote a piece about how the most brilliant physicist the world has seen since Einstein has come out as a mysterian about consciousness. Horgan noted that Witten was adopting a position similar to philosopher of mind Colin McGinn and linguist and cognitive scientist Noam Chomsky. There was an air of triumph in Horgan’s article he seemed delighted to have a famous scientist on board with the mysterian position. Why Horgan was so happy is unclear. Witten didn’t present a brilliant argument to support his position, nor did he present any empirical data to support his position. All Witten did in the short interview was assert that he personally found it difficult to conceive of a solution to the hard problem of consciousness. Yet some people take this bland assertion by Witten as a vindication of the fact that consciousness will permanently remain a mystery to science.
Since there seems to be no logical reason why one would be impressed with Witten making an assertion, for which he provided no evidence, one is left to speculate why Horgan and others were so excited about Witten’s claim. One obvious reason why a person would be so impressed by Witten’s non-argument is that he is a physicist. Physics is our most basic science, and theoretically we would like to reduce all other claims to the basic facts of physics. When an expert in physics claims that such a reduction is impossible one should take notice. Such an expert in physics will know more about the fundamental facts that govern our cosmos than philosophers like Daniel Dennett or Patricia Churchland will know. So perhaps an expert like Witten given his superior knowledge of physics; should be taken seriously, when he makes claims about the reduction of something to basic physics. Perhaps. Though given that Witten didn’t present a single piece of evidence to support his position; I would argue scepticism would be a more appropriate response, rather than the howls of delight that greeted Witten’s assertion.
At the very least if we are to argue that Witten’s claim has any validity he should be interviewed to try to understand precisely how he proposes to support his claim. Furthermore when discussing the reduction of x to y; it should be acknowledged that while Witten is legitimately considered an expert on x, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that Witten knows anything about y. In other words, while everyone agrees that Witten is an expert on physics he has never demonstrated any competence or understanding of the various sciences related to the mind; neuroscience, cognitive science, behavioural science, anthropology, philosophy of mind, phenomenology etc. This should be a worry for the people who want to treat Witten as the ultimate authority on the nature of the mind and its relation to physics. I would imagine that those who aren’t worried will fall into two camps (1) Those who have documented evidence on Witten’s expertise on the nature of the mind and consciousness, (2) Methodological Dualists who think that while we need to rely on the standard methods of science to understand all other aspects of the physical world, but that when it comes to humans above the neck casual reflection is sufficient achieve understanding .
I doubt that anyone will present evidence of Witten’s years of engagement with the sciences of the mind; though I would love if they did, I suspect the reason Witten worshipers don’t think he needs any training on the mind is because they are implicit methodological dualists. It strains credulity, given the stunning amount we have learned in the sciences of the mind over the last hundred and fifty years, that anyone could hold such an absurd anti-scientific world view. Nonetheless, a substantial amount of philosophers and physicists believe that when it comes to human consciousness, casual reflection on the contents of experience is sufficient to justify wide ranging metaphysical conclusions.
Science and Introspection: A Brief Interlude
As stated above it is unclear whether Witten has any knowledge of the relevant sciences of the mind; or whether he is just using his intuitive understanding of the consciousness to demonstrate that it cannot be reduced to physics. If Witten, or his followers are merely relying on casual introspection to support their claims, caution is warranted; scientific experimentation has demonstrated that consciousness may not be all that it pre-theoretically seems to be.
In Nick Chater’s 2018 book ‘The Mind is Flat’, he argues that current experimental data demonstrates that our mind doesn’t have the structure that casual introspective inspection implies. There is a certain sense in which Chater’s book reads like an updated version of Dennett’s 1991 ‘Consciousness Explained’. In fact Chater begins his book with a quote from Dennett’s ‘Consciousness Explained’:
“When we claim to be just using our powers of inner observation, we are always actually engaging in a sort of impromptu theorizing-and we are remarkable gullible theorizers, precisely because there is so little to ‘observe’ and so much to pontificate about without fear of contradiction” (Dennett ‘Consciousness Explained p. 68)
Chater argues in a similar manner to Dennett. He thinks that our so called introspective observation is a kind of impromptu theorising. Chater even uses the same example as Dennett to illustrate his point. It seems upon casual inspection that our entire visual field is in colour. An experiment which anyone can do is to place a playing card on front of you and to then move it to the periphery of one’s visual field. A typical person who is asked would guess that the card will be seen in colour whether it is at the centre or at the periphery of one’s visual field. However, as anyone who has done the experiment would attest when the card is at the periphery of one’s visual field it actually appears to be black and white. The result of this simple test, Dennett and Chater argue, shows that sometimes our supposed direct introspective experiences are actually just implicit theories we are using.
Chater presents a list of experimental data to show that introspection isn’t as reliable as we may uncritically assume:
(1) Impossible Objects: These are objects created by the Swedish artist Oscar Reutervard. These works of art give the appearance of being three dimensional objects. However when we analyse the objects we discover that the objects would be impossible to build as three dimensional. Chater draws three conclusions from these impossible objects (A) We aren’t inspecting some inner object that the mind has constructed as a mirror of reality, the mind is better thought of as an inference machine than as mirror of reality (B) We aren’t inspecting these impossible objects as a coherent whole, rather the mind is inspecting different parts of the object at different times in a piecemeal way. (C) Our misplaced confidence in introspection. We assume we are inspecting an actual three dimensional object, but we are in fact doing no such thing.
(2) Our assumption is that our visual field is uniform that we see colour at the periphery of our visual field. However, it is well known experimentally that our peripheral vision is both blind and blurry (‘The Mind is Flat’ p. 42). So again what we think we are experiencing through casual introspection, is now revealed to be false through detailed experimental studies. As Chater notes when discussing simple illusions: “Our visual experience can depend, rather dramatically, on where we are looking-and we are certainly unable to ‘load up’ this entire image into our minds- even though it is actually very simple and repetitive.” (ibid p. 43).
(3) Our intuition that we can see words all over the page when we read it is also an illusion. Chater discussed experimental data which uses ‘eye gaze tracking devices’ to demonstrate that in computer screen tests which consist of mostly blanked out words, interspersed with windows of words, if the computer maps the windows of texts to the eye gaze movements the person will not be aware that the screen consists of mostly blanked out words. Chater draws the following conclusion from the study: “The results suggest that the eye and the brain picks up little outside a very narrow ‘window’. Indeed, we can go a bit further the evidence suggests that we can only read one word at a time…Looking at a crowd, it turns out that you can only recognize one person at a time; looking at a colourful scene, you can only report colours or details of things that you are looking at directly. This does not imply, of course, that you pick up no information at all about objects you are not attending to- just that this information is extremely sparse. (ibid p. 46)
Other pieces of evidence which can be used to demonstrated that our consciousness experience isn’t as detailed as we like to think is the phenomenon of change-blindness. Change-blindness has been studied many different times experimentally. In his 2005 book ‘Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Objections to a Science of Consciousness’ discussed the phenomenon of change-blindness and the difficulties that it raises for defenders of qualia.
In his classes Dennett often used a demonstration from an experimental study by Rensink et al ‘To See or Not to See: The Need for Attention to Perceive Changes in Scenes’ (1997), as a way of tapping his students intuitions about the notion of qualia. In the demonstration two almost identical photographs are shown for almost 250 milliseconds each, separated by a 290 millisecond mask. This is repeated in alternation till the subject notices a difference between picture A and picture B. It usually takes between 20 and 30 seconds till people notice the differences between the pictures ( ‘Sweet Dreams’ p. 82).
When Dennett presents this test to his students, after they have finished it and indicated that they noticed the changes between the pictures, he asks them a question:
“Now before you noticed the panel changing colour, were your colour qualia for that region changing? We know that the cones in your retinas in the regions where the light from the panel fell were responding differently every quarter of a second, and we can be sure that these differences in transducer output were creating differences farther up the pathways of colour vision in your cortex. But were your qualia changing back and forth- white/brown/white brown-in time with the colour changes on the screen? Since one of the defining properties of qualia is their subjectivity, their “first-person accessibility,” presumably nobody knows – or could know- the answer to this question better than you. So what is your answer? Were the qualia changing or not? (ibid p. 83)
Dennett’s question is an important one to ask. It is sometimes assumed that we have direct access to our subjective experiences, that we know them in an intimate way that isn’t accessible to third person science. In the philosophical literature, these direct experiences are known as; qualia. But as Dennett notes the phenomenon of change blindness casts serious doubts on whether we understand qualia as directly as we think we do.
There are three possible answers to Dennett’s above question. (1) Yes my colour qualia were changing even though I wasn’t aware of that fact. (2) No my colour qualia wasn’t changing despite the changes occurring in my brain as I viewed the images (3) I don’t know (various reasons I don’t know could be): (A) I now am aware that I never really understood the concept of qualia all along, (B) I do understand the concept of qualia but I have no first person access to my qualia in this case, and third person science cannot get access to this qualia either.
Obviously any of the above answers will cause serious difficulties for the concept of qualia. The experiment shows that we don’t just have unproblematic access to our subjective states. None of the experimental data discussed by Dennett or Chater will be news to students of consciousness. Philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists etc have debated the significance of these experimental data and what they demonstrate about the nature of consciousness for years. I don’t bring up this data because I think it is conclusive against introspection as a tool; in fact I don’t think the experiments do rule out careful introspection as a tool. I bring up this data because there is no evidence whatsoever that Witten claims about the nature of consciousness and its relation to physics deal with any of this experimental work in the science of the mind.
Consciousness seems to be unique to those who are interested in understanding how the mind works. No serious student of language argues that by virtue of being a language using creature we can casually reflect on the nature of language and make pronouncements on syntactic structure. Imagine the response if some physicist, who the popular press labelled the new Newton, pronounced that he believed by casual reflection on his own language using abilities that, it is more likely that we would understand the big bang than that we would ever reduce syntactic structure to basic physics.
I am certain that any responsible linguist, would adduce a series of facts that have been discovered re-the empirical research into syntax. She would then ask whether the physicist demonstrated any understanding of the relevant facts; whether the physicist’s intuitive understanding of syntax matched the precise models that have been created by scientific investigation. With this done it would then be a matter of demonstrating to the physicist that her conception of syntax wasn’t sufficiently precise enough to understand the nature of the subject matter, scientific research was needed, not casual reflection on one’s own experience as a native speaker of English . However, if the physicist was open minded and wanted to learn what science has told us about the nature of syntax, the physicist could become a productive collaborator on the project.
However, in the case of Witten and consciousness things are more difficult to ascertain, as we don’t know why he thinks that consciousness cannot be reduced to physics. All we have to go on are Witten’s bland assertions, and the howls of delight by mysterians to have an authority of a physicist on their team. Until Witten, or his supporters, manage to flesh out his views on consciousness, and whether they are sensitive to the relevant scientific facts it is very difficult to judge the truth value of his claims.
It is ironic that mysterians feel so desperately insecure about their philosophical stance that they feel the need to appeal to the authority of people like Witten, because the mysterian position is a perfectly sensible one. Rather than engaging in appeals to authority, I would suggest that a more sensible approach to adopt would be to simply outline your own reason for thinking that mysterianism is more likely to be true than its competitors.

Part 2: A Proposed Explication of why Witten is a Mysterian
There are various different difficulties with trying to explicate consciousness interms of underlying brain states. Over the last fifty or so years as we have learned more and more about behavioural distinctions between different types of consciousness, and have developed good psychological models to explain various different types of conscious and unconscious states it has become much more tractable to study the neural correlates of consciousness.
However, it has been noted by a number of theorists, that none of these studies demonstrate why the particular conscious states have the qualitative feel that they do. There are a number of different ways of explicating this intuition which are now pretty standard. It is worth though briefly mentioning through famous intuition pumps which are designed to make the difficulties of reducing consciousness experience to the physical more salient.
(1) What is it like to be a bat?
The philosopher Thomas Nagel’s famous 1974 paper ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, was a thought experiment which was designed to illustrate the illusive nature of subjective experience from a third person perspective. Nagel noted that a scientist who is studying the bat, has a variety of different avenues available to him in his study. The scientist can study the bat from the point of view of behavioural tests, naturalistic observations, neuroscientific studies etc. However, Nagel argued that the Bat has a subjective world of his own which will be missing from any third person study done by the scientist. The Bat as he flies about will have a world of experience which will have a specific quality that will forever elude any understanding from the point of view of third person science.
Nagel believes that by reflecting on the subjective world of the bat it should be obvious that it’s direct first person experience is not the kind of thing which we could understand by appeal to third person science. In his ‘Consciousness Explained’ Dennett noted that Nagel’s choice of a Bat as his example was inspired. A bat as a mammal is enough like us to make us confident that it is conscious creature. If Nagel had chosen a fly or an earthworm as his exemplar a lot of people would have been less confident that there was any reason to believe that the creature in question was conscious. While if Nagel had chose a fellow primate who is much closer to us biologically a lot of people wouldn’t have been as confident in Nagel’s intuition that we couldn’t understand its mental states using third person science.
Nagel’s thought experiment has influenced a lot of scientists and philosophers that our subjective states and their precise nature are something that we cannot understand using third person science. And his thought experiment does have some initial plausibility. It does seem plausible to assume that Bat’s have subjective states which can only be truly understood through direct experience, and that third person science doesn’t tell us about these states or about how they are realised.
This of course leads us to the question of whether when Witten is arguing that the mind will never be explained interms of physics; he is pumping a similar intuition to Thomas Nagel? Witten does seem to be alluding to the so called Hard-Problem of consciousness when he asserts his mysterian position. Like Nagel, Witten argues that, while science will eventually give us a good functional understanding of the workings of the neural correlates of consciousness; but the actual subjective states we have; and why they have the quality they have, is something that won’t be accounted for by third person science.
In terms of the conclusions they adopt Nagel and Witten seem to be reading from the same page. Whether they reached their conclusions via similar arguments is a different question. Nagel’s thought experiment involved reflections on the conscious experience of a Bat, and his argument is meant to go through for all conscious creatures. Witten never mentioned whether he was referring to the consciousness of all mammals, or just human consciousness, whether he thought all animals or even insects were conscious. Whether there were different kinds of consciousness, and if so whether all of these different types of conscious states were equally un-amenable to scientific reduction. When Witten argues that consciousness isn’t suitable for scientific reduction it isn’t clear what the extension of consciousness is for him, or whether he is appealing to the type of intuitions that moved Nagel.
(2) The Problem of Mary:
While the relation of the intuitions that Nagel was pumping to the intuitions that Witten is pumping are difficult to demarcate; another intuition pump may be closer to the concerns that move Witten. I am thinking of Frank Jackson’s famous thought experiment about Mary a colour blind neuroscientist who in the thought experiment knows all the scientific facts that there are to know about the physics and psychology of colour vision. One day Mary has her colour vision fixed and she begins to perceive colour for the first time. The question then asked is whether Mary will learn anything new about colour vision when she first sees the colour red.
The conclusion typically drawn is that despite knowing all of the physical facts about colour vision, Mary would indeed learn something new when she first saw red. She would learn what red is like from the first person point of view. The intuition being pumped here is that no amount of third person science would be sufficient to generate direct first person experience.
A typical objection to the Mary thought experiment is that we have absolutely no idea of what it would be like to know ALL the scientific facts about colour vision. Given the obvious fact that we truly do not have any conception of what it would mean to know all the facts about colour vision; any extrapolations we make about what Mary would learn are entirely baseless.
A defender of Witten could argue that given that he is one of the more knowledgeable physicists alive today; his intuitions about having all physical knowledge of X would be more robust than your average philosopher. So we should take his intuitions about the Mary case more seriously than the intuitions of the average philosopher. Such a critic would have a point. However, once we acknowledge two points Witten’s intuitions on Mary seem just as un reliable as anyone else’s intuitions. (1) Witten may know a lot about physics but this doesn’t really give him much insight into what it would be like to know everything about the physics (unless we add the implausible premise that Witten is close to a complete theory of everything), (2) While Witten may know a lot about physics, there is no evidence he knows anything whatsoever about perceptual psychology. So there is really no compelling reason to think that Witten is any more capable of understanding how someone with ALL knowledge of colour vision would react upon receiving their sight than anyone else.
Again though it is unclear given the lack of detail in Witten’s argument for mysterianism whether his intuitions on the topic are derived from the intuitions pumped by Nagel or Jackson. The only theorist Witten does mention in his interview was the mathematician and physicist Roger Penrose. Penrose in his 1989 ‘Shadows of the Mind’ famously argued that the mind cannot be a computational device. He noted that Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem proved the incompleteness of mathematics by showing that in any mathematical proof we will be intuitively able to recognise certain truths that cannot be formally proven within the system. If someone argued that the brain was a computational device then they wouldn’t be able to explain how we grasp certain truths which cannot be computationally explicated. Therefore, Penrose argued, since the computational theory of mind is our best working model of the brain, and it can be proven mathematically to be incomplete, we must draw the conclusion that we don’t have a physical explanation of our mental capacities.
Again with Penrose’s argument we have no idea whether it is guiding Witten’s intuitions. All Witten did say re- Penrose was that he didn’t think that Penrose’s supposed solution to the problem would work.
At this stage even though we cannot say for sure what intuitions Witten was relying on re the non-reducibility of consciousness to physics, we at have at least briefly discussed a few problems with reductionism which may have influenced Witten. We will now proceed to discuss how these difficulties may have led to Witten being a mysterian about consciousness.
(3) Mysterianism as a Philosophical position:
A philosopher who is arguing that there are problems with reducing psychological predicates to physical predicates doesn’t automatically have to become a mysterian. As we briefly discussed above Roger Penrose thinks that understanding consciousness in terms of basic physics is at present not tractable. But he argues that if we make suitable modifications to our understanding of basic physics then this may solve the problem. So Penrose, despite having difficulties with current attempts to reduce the mind to the brain, doesn’t adopt a materialist approach to the mind body problem.
Furthermore, other scientists who don’t think that the mind can be reduced to physics aren’t directly led to a mysterian solution. There are various different approaches adopted by scientists and philosophers on this topic. There is the neutral monism of Ernst Mach, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, and William James. There is Eliminative Materialism held by the Churchland’s (who are eliminativists about propositional attitudes but not consciousness), Keith Frankish seems to be an eliminativist about consciousness and to a degree Dan Dennett is too (Dennett is not an eliminativist about propositional attitudes but seems to be about consciousness). Anomalous Monism argued for by Donald Davidson. Panpsychism has defenders in people like Galen Strawson, and David Chalmers amongst others. There many other competing views; epiphenomenalism, property dualism, substance dualism etc.
I do not here have space to evaluate these various competing positions in understanding the relation of the mind to the body. I just bring them up to demonstrate that many, philosophers and scientists see great difficulties in reducing the mind to the body; however they are not led by these difficulties to a mysterian position. So even if Witten did accept some of the difficulties put forth by Nagel, Jackson, and Penrose with reducing the mental to the physical; it should be noted that mysterianism doesn’t automatically follow from these difficulties.
Mysterianism typically starts out with the commonsense position that humans being animals will have limits to the things they can understand. Chomsky described the position as follows:
“As for the matter of cognitive reach, if humans are part of the natural world, not supernatural beings, then human intelligence has it scope and limits, determined by initial design. We can thus anticipate that certain questions will not fall within their cognitive reach, just as rats are unable to run mazes with numerical properties, lacking the appropriate concepts. Such questions, we might call ‘mysteries-for-humans’, just as some questions pose ‘mysteries-for-rats’. Among these mysteries may be questions we raise, and others we do not know how to formulate properly or at all.” (Chomsky ‘New Horizons in the study of Language and Mind’ p.107)

This position is perfectly sensible; as a human animal whose brain can only operate within certain fixed parameters it is perfectly sensible to suggest that there may be some problems which our brain is incapable of solving. Chomsky has suggested that ‘consciousness’ and ‘Freewill’ may fall with the realm of mysteries for those with human type intelligence.
Chomsky though is careful to note that he is only suggesting that ‘consciousness’ may be a permanent mystery to human intelligence. He isn’t claiming to have proof that consciousness falls within the mystery category. It is one thing to argue that humans being animals with a fixed cognitive structure may have cognitive limitations which makes some questions unanswerable for us. It is another thing to draw an actual line which demonstrates precisely where this line falls and to place certain subject matters on one side or the other of the problems/mysteries divide.
Colin McGinn argued that we have good reason to think that consciousness falls within the mystery category. As we saw above we have many different competing candidates for dealing with consciousness and at present we don’t have any way of deciding between these positions. McGinn thinks that the reason we cannot decide between these various positions, is because consciousness is beyond our capacity to understand. He argues that while we have made great progress in the last 2000 years in understanding cognitive structures in the brain, neural correlates of consciousness, etc we have made very little progress in understanding the hard problem of consciousness. He thinks that the best explanation of this difficulty in solving the hard problem of consciousness is that it is a mystery for creatures of our cognitive structures.
Personally I don’t agree with McGinn’s position that the hard problem of consciousness is a mystery. I don’t think that the disputes between the various different competing camps is as tractable as Mcginn thinks. Nonetheless I think that Chomsky is certainly correct in raising the possibility that consciousness may be a permanent mystery to humans.
As I said at the outset it is difficult to know why Witten is pessimistic about the possibility of reducing psychology to physics as he doesn’t present an argument. I have thus far sketched a possible justification for Witten. (1) People like Nagel, Jackson, and Penrose have presented good arguments that indicate that it may not be possible to explain subjective states in terms of third person science. (2) Chomsky has shown that humans being animals may have cognitive limitations which may mean that certain subjects will remain permanent mysteries for them, (3) Given the seemingly intractable situation with competing theories of how to reduce the mind to the body it is plausible that consciousness falls within the realm of mysteries.
Whether Witten is actually arguing in this manner is difficult to know as he is so sketchy of his reasoning on the topic. Anyway my reconstruction of Witten’s possible reasoning processes is the only sensible justification I can give of his vague comments.

Bertrand Russell, Little Albert and Murderous Rage

“This principle, as the reader will remember, states that, if a certain event calls out a certain response, and if another event is experienced just before it, or at the same moment, in time that other event will tend to call out the response which, originally, only the first event would call out. This applies to both muscles and to glands; it is because it applies to glands that words are capable of causing emotions. Moreover, we cannot set limits to the length of the chain of associations that may be established. If you hold an infant’s limbs, you call out a rage reaction; this appears to be an ‘unlearned reaction’. If, you and no one else, repeatedly hold an infant’s limbs, the mere sight of you will call out a rage reaction after a time. When the infant learns to talk your name may have the same effect. If, later, he learns you are an optician, he may come to hate all opticians; this may lead him to hate Spinoza because he made spectacles, and thence he may come to hate metaphysicians and Jews. For doing so he will no doubt have the most admirable reasons, which will seem to him to be his real ones; he will never suspect the process of conditioning by which he arrived at his enthusiasm for the Ku Klux Klan.” (Bertrand Russell ‘An Outline of Philosophy’ pp. 88-89)
In the above incredible passage Russell presents a toy example of how through a process of classical conditioning a child as he grows up into an adult could end up developing an irrational hatred of a particular group. On this picture a child would begin with an instinctive anger about being having his limbs held. Only one person is guilty of holding the child’s limbs, and that person is a visiting scientist. Through classical conditioning the child eventually comes to associate the scientist with being held. The mere sight of the scientist is enough to get the child to feel rage. In this respect the child is like Pavlov’s dog who salivates every time he hears a bell ring. Russell’s extrapolations are thus far consistent with known scientific data . Russell’s example is similar to the studies done by both Pavlov and Watson in classical conditioning. In Pavlov’s famous experiment the dog has an unconditioned reaction to food being presented (he salivates), and through conditioning; a bell being rung just before the food is presented, the dog salivates at the sight of the bell. The dog salivating to the bell is called a conditioned response. Russell’s toy example is similar in that the rage is an unconditioned response to being held and the conditioned response is the rage elicited at the sight of the scientist. Russell’s toy example stands up to critical scrutiny so far. Though to be more complete in his analysis, he should have discussed the fact that such conditioning processes wouldn’t necessarily continue on indefinitely, once the scientist had discontinued with the practice of holding the child’s limbs. Russell’s analysis implies that this classical conditioning will necessarily continue on to adulthood resulting in poorly understood rage. However in Pavlov’s original experiments it was noted that after a period of time where the unconditioned stimulus (the food) is presented without the conditioned stimulus (the bell), the dog ceases to salivate at the sight of the bell. Russell though is just uncritically assuming that the conditioned stimulus will continue throughout the child’s life.
The evidence for extinction occurring in classical conditioning is overwhelming. There have hundreds of studies done on extinction in behavioural science in the years since Russell wrote his ‘An Outline of Philosophy’. Russell cannot be held to account for not predicting the results of experiments which were not yet performed. Nonetheless, he is guilty of uncritically assuming that the effects of the conditioning will continue throughout the child’s life. This assumption was unjustified; even Pavlov writing years before Russell had noted the effects of extinction on conditioning.
A possible reason for Russell assuming that the effects of the conditioning would remain throughout the child’s life, were the existence of phobias. Some people spend their entire lives afraid of certain creatures because of experiences in their childhood. Russell greatly admired the work of J.B. Watson and discussed his work in ‘An Outline of Philosophy’ in great detail. Watson’s experiment with Little Albert was viewed at the time as a way of inducing a phobia in the child using classical conditioning. The child Little Albert is introduced to a white rat which he plays with for a while. Watson then makes a loud noise every time the child went to touch the rat. After a while the child is presented with the white rat and immediately becomes upset at the sight of the white rat despite no loud noise being made. It is then shown that the child generalises his fear of the rat to other furry creatures such as dogs, teddy bears etc. Russell may have extrapolated from the demonstrative fact that some people have irrational phobias in adulthood, and Watson inducing a phobia in a child through classical conditioning to the conclusion that adult phobias are the result of unintended classical conditioning of children in childhood. Such a conclusion obviously doesn’t follow from facts Watson presented. There wasn’t any evidence that Watson’s classical conditioning would last into adulthood.
If Russell had asserted that it was possible that adult phobias were the result of classical conditioning then his assertion would have been a reasonable hypothesis worth trying to test. However, Russell instead just assumed that classical conditioning in childhood would last into adulthood. It is possible that Psychoanalysis, which when Russell was writing his ‘Outline of Philosophy’ was world famous, implicitly influenced Russell’s thinking. Freud claimed to have demonstrated that childhood trauma can unconsciously influence adult behaviour and thought processes. Freud had justified his claim with his clinical work with patients who he claimed he cured by bringing their unconscious traumas to consciousness. Freud even argued that a lot of our explanations of our behaviour could be shown to be merely rationalizations that do not correspond with the real causes of our behaviour. As we saw above Russell made a similar point to Freud about the adult giving a rationalization to explain his racist views.
Given the esteem that Freud’s views on the importance of childhood experiences in determining adult behaviour, was held in when Russell wrote his ‘An Outline of Philosophy’, it is highly probable that Russell was influenced by Freud’s views. This would make sense of Russell’s uncritical assumption that classical conditioning of rage to a particular person would last into childhood. Russell may have reasoned as follows: (1) We know from Freud’s clinical work that trauma from childhood can last into adulthood, (2) Watson induced a phobia into Little Albert using classical conditioning, (3) Given Freud’s discoveries it is reasonable to assume that the classical conditioning used by Watson could last into adulthood, (4) Watson’s experiments are an excellent tool to explain adults with irrational phobias, this is indirect evidence that the conditioning lasts into adulthood. Obviously, if this was Russell’s reasoning process then it was non-demonstrative. Nonetheless it could be considered a reasonable inference to the best explanation. Russell’s imagined reasoning process would have been reasonable at the time. But since then the amply demonstrated notion of extinction in classical conditioning and the many methodological flaws with Freud’s psychoanalysis casts serious doubt as to whether the classical conditioning Russell is appealing to would actually continue to affect the adult’s behaviour. On the other hand, the existence of spontaneous recovery of conditioned responses after they have undergone extinction could be used as a point in Russell’s favour.
For the sake of argument we will assume that Russell’s view that the classical conditioning will continue to affect the child into adulthood is correct. And move on to the next step in the above passage by Russell. He goes on to note that this form of conditioning can be extended indefinitely. Thus when the child learns to associate a name (e.g. ‘J.B Watson’) with the person who held him, the name will then elicit the same feeling of rage. Russell’s extrapolation that the name will have the same effect as the person does is again probably based on Watson’s experiment with Little Albert.
In Watson’s experiment he purported to have shown that Little Albert generalized his fear of rats to other furry animals. Russell seemed to be thinking about Albert’s purported generalization to other furry animals as a reason to assume that the child in his above example will follow a similar process. Thus the child will unconsciously move from feeling rage at the adult being present, to feeling rage when he speaks or hears the adult’s name. Russell speculates that if the child learns that the scientist who abused him was also an optician; he could hate all opticians. This could lead to him hating Spinoza who was an optician and because Spinoza was a metaphysician and a Jew, the child could generalize to a hatred of all Jews and Metaphysicians.
The process that Russell is invoking is commonly referred to as ‘stimulus generalization’ and has been well studied and shown to have effects in both classical conditioning and operant conditioning. While people have made some legitimate methodological criticisms (and ethical criticisms) of Watson’s Little Albert Experiment, there have been hundreds of better constructed experiments verifying the effect in the last ninety years. So to a degree one could argue that Russell’s toy example invoking generalization is corroborated to some degree by experimental data.
Russell’s image is of a child as a result of classical conditioning and stimulus generalization developing strange aversions which as an adult are rationalized; while the real cause is something much different. One of the problems with this emphasis is that one is at a loss to explicate precisely what features will be generalized, and why. In Watson’s Little Albert experiment the child generalized to ‘small furry things’, while in Russell’s toy example the child over a period of years generalized from the person, to the name, to a description of the person An Optician, to all Opticians, to contingent features of particular opticians.
There seems to be no reason why a person would generalize in a particular way as opposed to another way. On Russell’s view the child is implicitly using the propositional function ‘x makes me angry’ and ‘x is the scientist’. However the when the child learns that the scientist is an optician he makes the further illicit inference: x makes me angry, x is an optician therefore opticians make me angry. But there are countless different facts about the scientist that are discoverable by child. The experimentalist is a scientist, he is an optician, he is a man, he could be short, fat, thin, hunchbacked or could have any other number of features. There seems to be no reason that the child would unconsciously generalize in one way or another on Russell’s account. So while Russell’s hypothesis has some good scientific data underlying it, he hasn’t presented a model that can predict in detail they way a person will generalize unconsciously. Nonetheless he has presented a useful explanatory model that can be used to explain people holding odd beliefs that they give unconvincing reasons for why they hold them.
Interestingly the principle of generalization was proposed by psychoanalyst Matte Blanco as one of the key features of unconscious thinking. Blanco used Russell and Whitehead’s Principia-Mathematica to formalise Freud’s theory of the unconscious. One difficulty with Blanco’s work is that he didn’t have a compelling causal account of the principle of generalization and his approach at times had a Cartesian disembodied feel. Watson’s work on classical conditioning and stimulus generalization would have been a useful tool to help give a naturalistic account of the purported structure of the unconscious mind.
It is interesting to note that Russell read a paper by Blanco where the principle of generalization is discussed in detail. Russell sent Blanco a note to say that he admired Blanco’s work. It is tantalizing to speculate whether Russell put together his own use of stimulus generalization expressed in his ‘An Outline of Philosophy’ with Blanco’s similar principle. Unfortunately there isn’t a record of Russell’s thoughts on Blanco’s ‘The Unconscious as Infinite Sets’.
As noted above there are plenty of criticisms of the methodology used by psychoanalysts. So people may not be overly impressed that some aspects of psychoanalysis seem to be in agreement with Russell’s hypothesis. It is worth noting though that Relation Frame Theory and its clinical off shoot Acceptance and Commitment Therapy also makes use of implicit generalizations to explain the behaviour of people with various kinds of behavioural problems.
Neither Blanco’s work or work in Relation Frame Theory are yet predictive of what type of generalizations a person will generate in a given instance. They are rather retrospective theories that can be used to explain the verbal behaviour of the patients that they deal with. Nonetheless I think it is fair to say that at present Russell’s speculation while not proven correct; is given what contemporary data tell us, a reasonable hypothesis.

Unconscious Logic and the Myth of the Given

Matte Blanco was a psychoanalyst who attempted to formalise Freud’s theory of the unconscious using the formal logic of Russell and Whitehead. Freud famously argued that the majority of our mental states are governed by unconscious ideas and feelings. Based on his clinical work Freud argued that our unconscious mind had the following five characteristics. (1) Absence of mutual contradiction between the presentations of its various impulses, (2) Displacement, (3) Condensation, (4) Absence of Time (5) Replacement of external by psychic reality (‘The Unconscious as Infinite Sets’ pp. 36-37). Freud noted that unconscious thinking that followed the logic of the above five principles would obviously differ dramatically from ordinary Aristotelian Logic. However he never managed to make explicit precisely how the logic of the unconscious actually worked from a formal point of view. Blanco argued that using two basic principles he could model the alternative logical principles that governed the unconscious.
The first principle that Blanco used was called The Principle of Generalization, and the second was called The principle of Symmetry. Blanco sensibly conceived of the mind as a classificatory system, which was constantly at work organising experience into different categories. This conception of the mind is pretty standard and most psychologists would accept that categorisation is an essential feature of the human (and non-human animal) minds. However, Blanco argued that at an unconscious level we categorise in strange ways that don’t fit with standard conscious ways of categorising our experiences. Blanco called this aspect of categorisation the principle of generalisation. Basically the idea is that our unconscious mind is driven to generalize to more and more abstract sets. Blanco notes that the unconscious mind treats a particular thing as though it were a member of a particular set which contains other members, it treats this set as a subset of a more general set, and treats this more general set as a subset of a still more general set and so on (Blanco ‘The Unconscious as Infinite Sets p. 38)
A concrete example of the above would be treating the furry thing sitting beside me as a member of the set of dogs, and the set of dogs as a subset of the more general set of mammals, and treating mammals as a subset of the more general set of animals etc. Now categorising things according to these principles seems to be just a standard way we consciously order the data of our experiences. But Blanco argues humans typically use these generalisations unconsciously and hence are not aware of the type of categories we are placing in that we are interacting with. Not all generalizations will carve nature at the joints in the way that the above example of the set of dogs does, and our childhood experiences will ensure that we use strange generalizations on an unconscious level.
Blanco supplements his principle of generalisation with a further clause. He argues that when the unconscious mind is engaging in generalisation it operates in a strange way. When the mind is generalising it prefers propositional functions which in one aspect bring about increasing generality, and in another aspect keep particular characteristics of the individual thing to which they started (ibid p.38).
Blanco’s second principle is his principle of symmetry where he argues that an unconscious level the mind treats the converse of any relation as identical with the relation (ibid p. 38). So while the conscious mind treats a relation such as ‘John is the father of Peter’ as an asymmetrical relation, at an unconscious level the mind selectively treats this relation as symmetrical. Thus at an unconscious level the mind would think that because ‘John is the father of Peter’ then ‘Peter is the father of John’. Blanco justifies modelling the unconscious mind this way because he thinks it can explain otherwise inexplicable facts about the behaviour of schizophrenics, neurotics, of dream experiences etc. As a psychoanalyst Blanco was obviously a keen follower of Freud and was trying to explain similar clinical data. However Blanco believed that he had achieved a nice tidying up of Freud’s explication because Blanco’s two principles could explain Freud’s conception of the unconscious in a simpler and clearer manner than Freud managed.
In a 1984 paper ‘Understanding Matte Blanco’ the logician, philosopher and psychoanalyst Ross Skelton criticised Blanco’s conception of the unconscious on formal grounds. Skelton argued that Blanco’s conception of the unconscious resulted in a state of affairs where the unconscious accepted contradictory facts as both being true. Skelton demonstrated that it would be impossible to model the unconscious in this way since in a system that accepted true contradictions anything could be proven. Since Skelton wrote his criticism there has been some brilliant work done by Graham Priest which takes some of the sting out of Skelton’s objection. However, I will not here discuss the formal way to reply to Skelton’s criticism. Here I want to focus on a curious aspect of the Blanco’s reply to Skelton.
Blanco acknowledged the logical point that Skelton made and the difficulties it posed but he then made two extremely strange replies to Skelton. Firstly he noted the following:
“Incidentally, though Ross Skelton explicitly directs his criticisms to me, it can, in my opinion, be said that his remarks could apply with equal right to Freud and to the unconscious. In order to be unambiguous I think he should establish whether he thinks that it is my formulation that is not a true reflection of Freud’s discoveries, and give the reasons for this.” (Matte Blanco: Understanding Matte Blanco)
I cannot speak for Skelton but personally I think that Blanco manages to brilliantly summarise Freud’s views and manages to capture the logic of Freud’s views on the unconscious accurately. Blanco though wonders incredulously whether Skelton thinks that Freud is wrong about the nature of the unconscious. Blanco seems to think that if Skelton’s arguments carried through to Freud as much as they did to Blanco that this would undermine Skelton’s argument. Blanco’s bringing in Freud seems to play no role other than an appeal to the authority of Freud. But I see no reason why this authority should be bowed too. If Skelton’s arguments go through against Freud, then they go through, there is no reason to not follow the logic where it leads simply because of who Freud was.
Blanco then offers another criticism of Skelton’s argument. He notes the following:
“I understand that this is very strange, and, therefore, hard for a logician to swallow. But, in my opinion, it reflects very faithfully the behaviour of the unconscious and Freud’s description of it. All the characteristics of the unconscious described by Freud are bi-logical structures…I must add that I do not believe that he is criticizing the unconscious for daring to neglect the rules of logic…As just said, I exclude that he wishes to criticize the unconscious. But if there is anybody who does not respect the laws of logic he is not Freud nor myself but precisely the unconscious. If such is the case, as Freud is sure it is and I am convinced by him, then one would ask (to put it with the words of a well-known song): ‘what should we do with the drunken sailor?” (Matte Blanco ‘Understanding Matte Blanco’)
Above we can see Blanco treat Freud’s conception of the unconscious as a thing that exists and has been observed. Skelton is arguing that you cannot construct a model of the unconscious using the logical principles Blanco proposes. Blanco’s incredulous reply is that the unconscious exists and is directly observed, if it doesn’t conform to the stringent ideals of the logician then so much the worse for the logician.
In his book on Blanco ‘Unconscious Logic’, Eric Rayner summarised Blanco’s argument as follows:
“Negation and its absence are both at the very core of any bi-logical thought. A serious difficulty appears to arise here. It is obvious that valid inference depends upon the logical consistency inherent in ordinary conscious level, traditional two valued logic. It has already been said that the essence of two-valuedness is that things which ‘are so’ and not ‘not so’ at the same time. Here the non-contradiction ‘If A then Not A’ is crucial. However, if Matte Blanco is proposing a system where this principle of contradiction can be absent, then surely everything and nothing can be explained by it and the theory is useless. This has been skilfully argued by Skelton (1984). Matte Blanco (1984) argued back that he was sorry; he did not invent the way the unconscious levels of the mind work. ( Eric Rayner ‘Unconscious Logic p. 46)
Rayner explicates Blanco’s reply as if the unconscious was an a-theoretical entity which was discovered and its nature is what it is, whether it conforms to our logic or not.
Blanco’s reply can be explicated using a concrete analogy. Blanco and Freud are like brave explorers who discovered the duckbilled-platypus, but who are confronted by theorists like Skelton who deny that the platypus exists. Blanco just needs to reply to the silly theorist by pointing at the platypus and thereby showing the errant theorist that reality is more complex than his a priori intuitions imagined.
However, the problem with the above image is that we don’t directly see the unconscious it is rather a theoretical construct we use to explain the behaviour of humans. Blanco seems to think otherwise:
“At this point I invite the reader to reflect on two points: the first is that the principle of symmetry is a logical way of describing and of arriving at the absence of negation which Freud observed directly in his study of patients and of dreams…” (Matte Blanco ‘The Unconscious as Infinite Sets’ p. 50)
Above you can see Blanco speak of Freud “directly observe” the unconscious ( Blanco even italicized ‘directly’ for emphasis). However as Blanco was well aware Freud never observed the unconscious, rather he inferred its existence. In his 1915 paper ‘The Unconscious’ Freud argued that it was necessary to postulate the existence of the unconscious to explain otherwise inexplicable facts. Freud used the postulation of the unconscious to explain the nature of parapraxes, jokes, dreams etc. He argued that the best way to explain these behaviours was to postulate the unconscious. Freud made the following point “A gain in meaning is a perfectly justifiable ground for going beyond direct experience” ( Freud ‘The Unconscious’ p. 159). Freud was working in Vienna where the positivist Mach was treated like a God, where logical positivism was on the brink of springing forth. But Freud never went along with the widely held prejudice of the Vienna of his time against theoretical postulates. His unconscious was precisely such a postulate, and one that bore some interesting fruit.
So we can see that Blanco’s reply to Skelton was a nonsense. The Unconscious was a theoretical model to explain human behaviour, and Skelton’s argument proposed that such a model couldn’t be constructed in a meaningful manner . Blanco’s pretence that the unconscious had already been directly observed was a bluff, the fact is that he had a model and he didn’t know how to complete it. So the question begging assumption that his model of the unconscious had already been discovered was a way of pretending that the technical criticisms he was facing were irrelevant.
The above criticism seems a bit harsh on Blanco. However I don’t mean it to be interpreted in that way. Blanco was a brilliant theorist and psychoanalyst. His work was groundbreaking. When I argue he was bluffing I don’t necessarily mean that he was doing this at a conscious level. He may not have been aware of what drove his rhetorical stance.
Furthermore there is a sense in which Blanco had a point in his criticism of Skelton’s argument. Research in quantum mechanics has put pressure on our intuitive understanding of the law of non-contradiction. At one point Kant believed that we knew a priori that space operated according to the principles of Euclidean Geometry. However both empirical and theoretical research showed that non-Euclidean Geometries are better ways to model space. So Blanco wasn’t being absurd in thinking that the discoveries being made through the theoretical postulate of the unconscious shouldn’t just cave to a logical argument. The incredible predictive capacity of quantum mechanics forced philosophers to try to develop different logical models to explain the data. Likewise Blanco could have argued that the gain in understanding by adopting a psychoanalytic perspective should make us consider developing a different logical system to model the unconscious mind.
Skelton’s argument indicated that Blanco’s model didn’t seem up to the job. But today there exist more flexible logics which seem up to the task. It will be interesting to see if these models are more successful in accounting for the clinical data than Blanco’s model was.

Fuzzy Sets: Intellectual Dark Web, New Atheism, Logical Positivism and Behaviourism

Introduction
In this blog-post I will be discussing the Intellectual Dark Web and trying to understand what its distinctive features are supposed to be. To help understand what the features of the group are I will discuss it in relation to three other groups. This first group I will compare it to will be New Atheism in particular as it is represented by the famous Four Horsemen of Atheism. I will then compare it to two major research programmes in the last Century the Vienna Circle and Behaviourism. The purpose of these comparisons will be to evaluate the degree to which the Intellectual dark web compares with these groups in the clarity of its purposes and what they aim to achieve.
Before proceeding to the comparison I need to make a couple of brief caveats. Firstly, to forestall an obvious complaint, I am in no way comparing the intellectual importance of these respective groups. I hope it should be obvious that I am in not arguing that people like Joe Rogan, and Jordan Peterson belong in the same intellectual universe as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rudolph Carnap or B.F. Skinner. I feel embarrassed even having to make this point; but I will do so to avoid confusion.
Another complaint could be that I am not comparing like with like. The Vienna Circle and the Logical Positivism it developed was an actual research programme, and the same is obviously true of Behaviourism. But the Four Horsemen of Atheism and the new atheism they were leaders of wasn’t a scientific research programme. Rather it was better to think of them as a political movement interested in treating questions about religion and God by the standard methods of science. I think that this is a legitimate criticism. However it doesn’t really affect anything I am arguing here as I am just trying to clarify what type of group the Intellectual Dark Web is, and how it compares with other intellectual groups. I am not offering any criticisms of the Intellectual Dark Web for not being a scientific research programme.
The Four Horsemen of Atheism
Intellectual life, like all areas of life, is pervaded with territorial allegiances. Thinkers form groups which they use to separate themselves from those whom they think of as holding a different ethos about life. In the act of naming a group the members of the group become associated with the name and sometimes people have difficulties disambiguating members of the group. Ten years ago four academics met up to discuss and critique religion from a scientific and philosophical point of view. The four thinkers were Dan Dennett, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Richard Dawkins; all were already famous atheists and known as members of so called new atheism (which was considered more aggressive than traditional atheism). Prior to meeting in Hitchens’ apartment to discuss the question of religion all four of them had authored a book criticising religion and belief in God. Sam Harris published his ‘End of Faith’ in 2004, Dawkins published his ‘The God Delusion’ in 2006, Dennett published ‘Breaking the spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomena’ in 2006, and Hitchens published his ‘God is not Great in 2007. All four books were massive successes, and prior to writing the books they were already famous for their atheism. So in 2007 when they met up to discuss religion and God and released the discussion to the general public there was huge interest. They became known as the four horsemen of atheism and set off millions of internet debates.
What was interesting about these debates was that in some circles ‘The Four Horsemen’ were treated as though they were identical people who agreed on every topic. The four horsemen were all sceptics about religion and its effects on society and were all atheists; however they obviously didn’t agree on everything. Harris and Dennett disagreed on the nature of consciousness, and on freewill. Dennett and Dawkins disagreed about the use of the term ‘Design’ in evolutionary explanation. Dawkins politics was slightly more leftwing than Hitchens etc. Yet even when these differences were pointed out some people couldn’t separate out the members of it group. It was like as if the existence of a label for the four thinkers worked against some people’s capacity to distinguish between the members of the group. Nonetheless the label was helpful to the members of the group. It was a nice marketing tool, and it helped to entice guys who liked Hitchens’ writing to read the other four horsemen and vice-versa.
The Intellectual Dark Web
Flash-forward twelve years and one of the Four Horsemen of Atheism, Sam Harris appears in a photo shoot for a group called the Intellectual Dark Web. A New York Times Article is written by Bari Weiss on the Intellectual Dark Web , complete with the shadowy photos illustrating the leaders of this new movement. They are described as brave renegades fighting against the shadowy forces of political correctness. The article is an instant marketing success and the internet explodes with argument after argument.
The IDW is a much larger group of thinkers than the Four Horsemen. Bari Weiss listed members of it as including Sam Harris, Brett Weinstein, Eric Weinstein, Jordan Peterson, Christina Hoff Summers, Ben Shapiro amongst many others. What makes someone a member of the IDW? Barri Weiss offers the following vague unhelpful definition:
“Most simply, it is a collection of iconoclastic thinkers, academic renegades and media personalities who are having a rolling conversation — on podcasts, YouTube and Twitter, and in sold-out auditoriums — that sound unlike anything else happening, at least publicly, in the culture right now. Feeling largely locked out of legacy outlets, they are rapidly building their own mass media channels.”
She notes that these iconoclastic thinkers are committed to disagreeing strongly with each other while also remaining civil when engaging in this discourse. A couple of lines down, without a hint of irony she gleefully notes that Jordan Peterson responded to an article by Pankaj Mishra which criticized Peterson, by calling Mishra a sanctimonious prick who Peterson would like to slap. Bari Weiss who claimed that to be a member of the IDW is to remain civil while having intellectual disputes; didn’t seem to spot any difficulty in the aggressive uncivil behaviour of one of the leaders of the IDW when someone criticises him.
This is one of the problems with the IDW, it extension is extremely vague. If the being civil to ones critics was a key defining property of its members than Peterson wouldn’t be included in the group. If being banned from your institute because of political correctness was a key criterion for being a member then Sam Harris couldn’t be a member. And the attempt to individuate them as iconoclastic thinkers who are having discussions on podcasts and on twitter etc is equally hopeless. Philosopher Robert Wright has appeared on Sam Harris’s podcast to discuss Buddhism, Harris has appeared on the Very Bad Wizard podcast and vice-versa, and of course Wright has appeared on the Very Bad Wizard podcast and one of the Very Bad Wizard’s (Tamler Sommers), has appeared on Wright’s podcast. Similarly, people like Russell Brand have had Jordan Peterson and Sam Harris on their podcast, Brand has appeared on the Joe Rogan podcast to discuss politics, religion etc. So do the Very Bad Wizards, Russell Brand, or Robert Right belong in the IDW? If not why not? They are an iconoclastic bunch of thinkers who are having an ongoing online discussion, they are committed to civil discussion with each other (I haven’t heard any of them threaten to punch a critic in the face yet). Admittedly they haven’t faced trouble in a University over their political views, then again neither has Harris and he is a member of the IDW.
When people interview members of the IDW they typically emphasise that they all hold different views on a variety of different topics and so, for example, Harris shouldn’t be held responsible for the views of Jordan Peterson. This is similar to the way it would have been a mistake to assume that all of the members of The Four Horsemen held the same views on consciousness. However, there is one clear difference with the four horsemen they claimed to be in agreement on their atheism and on the fact that atheists should be more critical towards religion than had typically been the case. So there were certain key features that the members of the group all shared in common and this was clearly delineated. With the IDW this is not the case. There seem to be no core beliefs that hold them together in a set that exclude people who are not members e.g. Massimo Pigliucci, Robert Wright etc. It is hard to view the IDW as anything other than a marketing plan of a group of friends to promote each-others work.
Even the members of the IDW don’t seem to agree on the significance of the group or what it stands for. In pod-cast Sam Harris portrayed the whole thing as a bit of a joke that isn’t meant to be taken that seriously. Eric Weinstein, on the other-hand, argued that he came up with the name IDW in a deliberate manner to implicitly force the mainstream media (who according to Weinstein have some problem with them), to inadvertently promote the group. It is as difficult to know whether Harris’s account of the IDW or Weinstein’s is meant to be the authoritative, as it is to know what the criterion for membership of the IDW is meant to be. At the moment the so called IDW seems to be little more than a marketing plan to bring attention to a group of podcasts.
The Vienna Circle and Logical Positivism
Of course, just because something has an inauspicious beginning doesn’t mean that it isn’t capable of being developed further once a bit more thought is put into the project. One of the more famous groups in the history of philosophy is the Vienna Circle, they are now remembered as logical positivists, but they began as a discussion group between a few PhD students interested in science, mathematics, logic and philosophy. The group eventually became known because of their joint manifesto on the nature of the movement, and popular books designed to spread it, but in the beginning they were a group held together by shared interests not by an official doctrine.
The unofficial head the group was Moritz Schlick who was trained as a physicist but was working as a professional philosopher. Schlick was known as “Einstein’s Pet Philosopher”, and wrote a book outlining the philosophical implications of Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. But he soon came under the sway of another great man: Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus became a kind of bible for the group. His use of Frege and Russell’s logic to draw limits to what could sensibly be said about reality was exactly what the logical positivists were looking for in their battle against metaphysics. Wittgenstein seemed to have provided a clear criterion that could be used draw a line to demonstrate when claims that had been made were not empirical but were metaphysical nonsense.
However despite his work being central importance to the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein wasn’t exactly a member. The group did manage to get him to attend some of the meetings, but he didn’t attend regularly and he didn’t approve of the views of many members of the group. Furthermore despite his work being of central importance to the group, there was not universal agreement on how his work was to be interpreted. Some members of the group such as Otto Neurath sneered at the reverence that Wittgenstein was held in by Schlick and Waisman; and argued that Wittgenstein was treated like the leader of a religious cult instead of as a fellow logician. Others such as Carnap was impressed with Wittgenstein’s work; but didn’t agree with all of it. One of the difficulties with Wittgenstein’s work was that it purported to divide statements into three subcategories: empirical propositions, logical and mathematical propositions (construed as tautologies), and metaphysical sentences (nonsensical sentences). The difficulty was that the propositions of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus were not in any obvious sense either tautologies or empirical propositions. They seemed on the face of it to be metaphysical claims which on Wittgenstein’s theory were nonsensical so the entire book could be construed as building up its arguments using nonsensical claims.
The important point to note is that the logical positivists didn’t all agree on how to deal with this problem. Despite being members of a single group they didn’t all agree on either the importance of Wittgenstein’s work, nor on how to deal with difficulties interpreting his Tractatus. And this wasn’t the only point of dispute within the group. There was an intractable debate on the status of protocall sentences that virtually none of the members of the circle could agree on. Nonetheless despite holding many disagreements there were core principles that held the group together. They were all empiricists, promoting a science based world view and who thought that the new logic was the best way of systematizing our best scientific theory of the world.
So the Logical Positivists, like the Four Horsemen, disagreed on many subjects but they were held together by a core set of beliefs on certain topics, in this way they differed from the IDW which doesn’t seem to be held together by any core beliefs that separates them from people who were not members of the IDW. However as we saw above when the Logical Positivists began meeting first they were just some like minded friends interested in a science based world view. It was only later that they developed an explicit manifesto about what the group represented. Likewise the IDW as far as I can see at the moment is nothing but a collection of friends who are promoting each-others work. But it is possible that like the Vienna Circle the IDW could eventually develop a set of core principles that they stand for. It is just that as things stand there seems to be no core principles they stand for that can be used to differentiate them from anyone else.
The Behaviourists
Of course even having a manifesto doesn’t guarantee unity on core topics. J B Watson’s ‘Psychology as the Behaviourist Views It’, could be viewed as the document that launched behavioural psychology . It has been a hundred years since Watson wrote his famous text and to this day a lot of scientists still identify as behaviourists. However, it would be a difficult task to extrapolate precisely what it is that makes one a behaviourist other than an emphasis on behaviour and scepticism about introspection as a tool.
Watson and Skinner are probably the two most famous behaviourists, they disagreed on many things. Watson was a stimulus response theorist, while Skinner used the three term contingency to explicate behaviour. Watson argued that we couldn’t study private events scientifically, while Skinner argued that private events are a form of behaviour that can be studied in the same way as any other behaviour. However, even amongst the neo-behaviourists who tried to move beyond Watson’s behaviourism there wasn’t a homogenous set of beliefs held by all of them. Thus Edward C Tolman believed that it was acceptable for a behaviourist to use inferred constructs, and cognitive concepts, Clark L Hull argued that behaviourists could use inferred constructs but not cognitive concepts, while Skinner argued against inferred constructs, and cognitive concepts (‘Logical Positivism and Behaviourism’ p. 305). While Hull argued that behaviourism should be a deductive science, Skinner and Clark argued that it should be an inductive science (ibid p. 305).
Tollman considered himself a behaviourist and is considered a behaviourist to this day, however given that he allowed cognitive constructs and inferred entities it is difficult to see why his views should be considered any different than those of a contemporary cognitive scientist. Behaviourism started as a reaction against the introspective tradition in psychology and most cognitive scientists would agree that introspection is a bad tool to rely on in science. With some behaviourists such as Tolman it is hard to find a line that distinguishes them from non-behaviourists; whereas with others such as Skinner the line is a bit clearer.
Behaviourism like both logical positivism and the four horsemen of atheism was largely defined by what they were against; Introspective Methods in psychology, Metaphysics and a belief in God. In the hundred or so years since Behaviourism was first proposed as a method, it has branched off in many different directions; methodological behaviourism, radical behaviourism, applied behavioural analysis, relational frame theory etc. Some behavioural theories can be clearly distinguished from other branches of psychology such as cognitive science, while it more difficult to distinguish some kinds of behaviourism from cognitive science.
It is clear though what it was the behaviourists were reacting against and that the movement developed in concrete ways and was successful in dealing with most of the problems that it set itself. This distinguishes it from the IDW, it is unclear who they are opposing, what makes them different than people who aren’t members of the group, and what would constitute the group being successful.
Conclusion
In our comparison of the IDW with other groups we have noted that unlike all of the other groups there appears to be no clear criterion as to what makes someone a member of the group. This isn’t a devastating indictment of the group, as it is possible that overtime they will develop a coherent ethos. Nonetheless as things stand the IDW is a group of individuals that seems to be grouped together on the basis of mutual marketing and nothing else.

 

Russell: Negation and Innate perceptual Judgements

In Russell’s ‘An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth’ he discussed how we apply propositions involving ‘negation’ and the relation of these propositions to experience. Russell’s primary concern was how experience could show that a proposition is false. He noted that while negative propositions seem to have an immediate relation to experience they in fact involve not immediate experience; but perceptual judgements. Thus suppose we are told that the fridge contains cheese and butter. When we look in the fridge we immediately see the cheese, however when we look in the fridge we also discover that there is no butter. Russell thinks that discovering that cheese is in the fridge and discovering that butter is not in the fridge are not of the same logical type.
When we look in the fridge we do not see the absence of butter, rather we see a series of products. We then judge that these products are not butter, and as they are only products in the fridge, we judge that there is not butter in the fridge. Russell also notes that to make a negative judgement involves linguistic capacities. If a non-linguistic creature peered into the larder and just looked at what was there and made arbitrary judgements about what was not there; the creature could make an infinite amount of judgements as to what was not in the larder. There are a potential infinite amount of objects that are not in the larder at any given moment. He argues that when one involves linguistic communication this potentially infinite amount of negative judgements gets paired down. Thus, if someone will says ‘there is butter and cheese in the fridge’, this will make it more likely that the other person will make the judgement that there is ‘no butter in the fridge’ when they do the relevant search.
Russell’s discussion of negative propositions is admirably done in relation to concrete examples. He asks us to consider a very simple negation: ‘This is not white’. We are to imagine that we said the above statement in response to a judgement about laundry (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth p. 77). So we have in our minds eye the proposition ‘this is white’ but your direct experience elicits the proposition ‘this is grey’. The question is how do we go from the proposition in our minds eye, the proposition elicited by our direct experience to the negative judgement ‘this is not white’?
Russell offers two possible ways to arrive at the negative proposition:
(1) You know the general proposition ‘what is grey is not white’, and from this together with ‘this is grey’ you derive the proposition ‘this is not white’.
(2) You confront the word ‘white’ with what you see and perceive an incompatibility. (ibid p. 77)
Russell notes that from the point of view of pure logic (1) or (2) must be the correct answer. As from you cannot logically derive conclusions that are negations from premises which don’t contain negations (ibid p. 77) So if we are to have negative propositions they need to either be basic propositions, either pure negations as in (2) or derived from implications of the ‘form p and not q’ as in (1). Logic allows no other possibility.

The Case of Incompatible Colours
“…Two different colours cannot coexist at the same place in one visual field. Position in the visual field is absolute, and may be defined by relation to the centre of the field by means of two angular coordinates which we may call ⱷ, ⱸ. I am saying that we know the following proposition: ‘at a given time and in a given visual field, if the colour A is at the place ⱷ, ⱸ, no other colour B is at this place’. More simply: ‘this is red’ and ‘this is blue are incompatible.” (ibid p.78)
Russell argues that the above generalisation is one that we intuitively know to be true but how we know it to be true is difficult to ascertain. According to Russell it isn’t a logical truth as Red and Blue are not logically incompatible, nor does it appear to be a truth which is derived from experience.
Russell notes that there are many other sensible qualities which we immediately recognise to be incompatible, he gives a variety of different examples such as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, ‘hot’ and ‘cold’, ‘sweet’ and ‘sour’ etc (ibid p. 78).The important point about the preceding examples is that they are not examples of logical incompatibility. He argues that if we take these incompatibilities as basic propositions, they must be grounded on the basic general proposition (which is a more abstract version of (1) above):
(3) “For all possible values of x, ꬿx implies not ꬸx. Here ‘ꬿx’ may be ‘x is blue’, and “ꬸx’ may be ‘x is red’.” (ibid p. 78)
Russell argues that with the help of the general proposition above we can infer from seeing that ‘x is red’ that ‘x is not blue’. The important point to note here is that the inference ‘x is not blue’ is derived from a non-empirical proposition (3) above. Russell is not very happy with the above conjecture as to how we arrive at our negative proposition ‘x is not blue’. However he is not very clear on why he is unhappy with his conjecture he merely vaguely claims that the conjecture is not very plausible or satisfying. He then moves on to a different attempt to solve the problem which he also finds unsatisfactory. However before delving into his second attempt to solve the problem of negation I will critically evaluate Russell’s first attempt to solve the problem of negation.
Russell, Evolution and Innate apparatus
Russell found his above explanation implausible. One of the reasons for this was that he preferred to justify his speculations on empiricist grounds and was reticent to use rationalist explanations. Rationalist explanations were generally held in pretty low esteem at the time Russell was writing. There were a number of reasons that rationalism was not looked upon unfavourably at the time. Rationalists such as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz were at the forefront of the scientific revolution. However their rationalist explanations of the success of science came under severe pressure through arguments of the empiricist philosophers who contended that empiricist explications of the sciences explained its success better. One difficulty that empiricists had with rationalist explanations was that it was utterly mysterious how we derived our capacity of so called ‘a priori’ knowledge. Prior to the scientific revolution and the birth of rationalist tradition; philosophers such as Plato and Saint Augustine argued that humans had innate knowledge in areas such as morality, mathematics etc. However they had no convincing explanation of this a priori knowledge. Plato argued that we had innate ideas acquired in a prior life that we could remember by contemplation of the forms, while Saint Augustine claimed we arrive at this universal knowledge through a revelation from god. None of the rationalists had a more compelling explanation of how we acquire non empirical knowledge of things like mathematical truth; for example, Descartes had to bring God into the picture as a guarantor of the validity of our logical and mathematical truths.
Philosophers in Russell’s time were impressed by the empiricist criticism of rationalist epistemology; however, they weren’t convinced that the great empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) had a compelling account of mathematical knowledge etc. In ‘Inquiry into Meaning and Truth’ Russell wasn’t interested giving an explanation of how we acquired our mathematical knowledge. Rather he was trying to demonstrate how we derive our knowledge claims from basic perceptual beliefs. In his introduction to ‘An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth’ Russell noted:
“I shall, throughout this book, try to avoid the consideration of logical and mathematical knowledge, which does not raise the problems which I wish to discuss. My main problem, throughout, will be the relation of basic propositions to experiences, i.e., of the propositions that come first in the epistemological order to the occurrences which, in some sense, are our grounds for these propositions.” (ibid p. 16)
He was interested in analysing our language, and discovering how we go from simple object languages which pick out perceptual features of our environment, to a secondary language which included logical constants, true and false, and so on up the hierarchy of languages. But as we saw above when moving from the object language to the meta language Russell immediately ran into difficulties as to how we could do this based entirely on perceptual experiences. He was forced to admit the unempirical basic proposition which is necessary to form negative judgements from experiences:
(3)“For all possible values of x, ꬿx implies not ꬸx. Here ‘ꬿx’ may be ‘x is blue’, and “ꬸx’ may be ‘x is red’.” (ibid p. 78)
Russell was uncomfortable with appealing to an unempirical basic proposition but didn’t have any other compelling way to explain our knowledge in this domain. As we saw above though appeals to non-empirical knowledge had a chequered history in philosophy. An atheist philosopher like Russell, who had strong empiricist leanings, would have been extremely uncomfortable with the explanations of non-empirical knowledge that philosophers such as Plato, Augustine and Descartes provided. While Russell was prepared to countenance unempirical knowledge, he was extremely uncomfortable with doing so and only did so if he had no other choice.
An avenue available to Russell to explain non-empirical knowledge was the theory of evolution. Yet Russell, unlike later philosophers, such as Chomsky and Quine never made much use of this avenue. When Russell was considering how a human could derive negation from experience he didn’t sufficiently appreciate how important negation or proto-negation would be to living creatures in the wild.
Russell gave the example of a person looking in the fridge and forming the judgement that ‘there is no butter in the fridge’. He then tried to analyse how the person would be capable of forming the judgement and considered a variety of different difficulties with his explanations. But better question with more immediate consequences would be how could a mouse form the proposition ‘there is no cat in this field’?
If we consider the question about a mouse forming a negative proposition from an evolutionary perspective; things look much different. Russell noted that we cannot form a negative proposition purely from the fact that something is not present in the field. There are an infinite amount of possible entities that are not present in the field. So the mouse going into the field would have to make an infinite amount of judgements about what is not present in the field. Of course from an evolutionary perspective such a situation would not occur. A mouse isn’t just some blank slate who forms its judgements entirely based on empirical observation. A mouse will have particular concerns and interests that will limit the type of hypotheses it makes. A creature that couldn’t make snap judgements as to whether there were no predators in the field before entering it to eat would be culled by natural selection in no time. Animals pausing to consider the infinite possibilities of counterfactual entities before acting wouldn’t last long enough to pass on their genes in the time constrained environment that natural selection acts on.
A logician like Russell didn’t consider the time and energy constraints on a living creature trying to survive in its environment. Natural Selection builds cheap fast brains that do the minimum; i.e. try to survive long enough to pass on their genes to the next generation. Such a creature will not will not consider logical possibilities; rather they will be concerned with salient information, the salience being primarily what will get me food for energy, what will help me find a mate, and what danger may be nearby.
With this fact in mind, Russell’s question about the perceptual basis of forming negation takes on a different hue. The non-linguistic creature will have expectations of what there is in the world it is exploring and a quick glance will tell the creature that some things that it expects to be there are in fact not there. From here is a short step for the creature to form the judgement ‘there is no cat in the field’. So from an evolutionary perspective there is little reason to follow Russell in arguing that forming perceptual judgements of negation must involve linguistic capacities.
Likewise, there is little reason to follow Russell in worrying about the fact that he has to use non empirical axioms to show how we derive negative propositions. From an evolutionary point of view we would expect any creature to come to the learning situation choc o bloc with innate apparatus.
An obvious objection to my above discussion is that it relies on the unargued assumption that non-linguistic creatures use propositional attitudes when thinking. However, my argument isn’t actually reliant on this assumption. I am arguing that IF non linguistic creatures think using propositional attitudes, natural selection will have build constraints in to the possibilities the creatures will entertain when judging what is or is not in the environment, and these innate constraints will make it much easier to form negative judgements.
Russell’s Second Way of Forming Negation
We saw above that Russell had little reason to be so wary about appealing to unempirical knowledge once we adopt an evolutionary perspective. Russell offered another way we a creature could acquire negation. This way involved comparing a word such as ‘white’ and judging whether the environment contained this entity. Russell seemed to view this explanation as in competition with his first explanation in terms of non-empirical grasping of incompatibility. However, there is no reason to view these explanations as in competition they could both play a role in people acquiring the use of negation.
On difficulty with Russell’s discussion of our use of word’s was that he didn’t really appreciate the role of reinforcement shaping how language is used. To this end I think that using Skinner’s work on Verbal Behaviour would help push Russell’s explication in the right direction.
In his ‘Verbal Behaviour’ Skinner discussed the type of perceptual experiences which would work to elicit the response ‘Not Red’. While Russell was concerned with the fact that we seem to be able to form non-empirical judgements about our perceptual field:
“I am saying that we know the following proposition: ‘at a given time and in a given visual field, if the colour A is at the place ⱷ, ⱸ, no other colour B is at this place’. More simply: ‘this is red’ and ‘this is blue are incompatible.” ( An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth p.78)
Skinner was more concerned with the environmental and social contingencies which would shape our response ‘Not Red’:
“The stimuli which continue to strengthen Red and which therefore continue to produce the qualified Not Red are only those situations which are similar to red. Blue will not only not evoke Red, it will not evoke Not red. A strong reddish-orange, may however, do so. Additional verbal stimulation- for example, the echoic prompt red- may, of course evoke the response Not red in the presence of a blue object” ( B.F. Skinner ‘Verbal Behaviour p. 324)
When Skinner is discussing negation he does so in relation to what he calls a qualifying autoclitic. He defines a qualifying autoclitic as “a function that qualifies the tact in such a way that the intensity or direction of the listener’s behaviour is modified” (ibid p. 322). In this respect Skinner asks us to consider the qualifying autoclitic of ‘No’. ‘No’ can be used to qualify any tact. The tact ‘rain’, which is under the control of a particular environmental event, could theoretically be metaphorically extended to include such things as a water sprinkler and metonymically extended to a dark grey sky. If the verbal community that a speaker is a member of doesn’t reinforce such metaphorical and metonymical extensions, or even punishes it, this type of Verbal Behaviour will decrease in use.
Skinner notes that ‘no’ is used a lot of times as a mand to change behaviour. Thus if a child is playing with something dangerous the parent will say ‘no’. In this instance ‘no’ functions as a mand to change ones behaviour; to stop doing what one is doing. This use of ‘no’ as a mand also occurs with verbal behaviour. Thus if a child pronounces a word wrong or uses it in the wrong circumstances the parent will say ‘no’ and may follow the ‘no’ with an explanation of what is wrong with the behaviour. So a child growing up will pretty quickly come to understand that ‘no’ is a mand to stop or change what you are doing.
When a person is using a tact such as ‘Red’, it is possible to modify the tact by using the qualifying autoclitic ‘no’. A person who has grasped the use of no as a mand to modify behaviour could of course apply it to his own verbal behaviour. He could apply it to any statement about our perceptual experiences and modify the intensity or direction of the statement. Thus when the person sees a dog he could use the tact ‘cat’ and qualify it by saying ‘no-cat’, meaning that the tact that ‘there is a cat present’ is false. However Skinner argues that a person will only qualify a tact with a ‘no’ in certain circumstances. As we saw above he gives us the example of something red; he notes that ‘red’ is unlikely to evoke either ‘blue’ or ‘not-blue’. The rationale for this is that we wouldn’t use a qualifying negation for no reason. Something reddish may act as a stimulus for us saying ‘not-red’ as it is close enough in hue to red to be confused with it so we could use a qualifying tact to ‘not-red’ upon being presented with a redish orange object. If a person were to say ‘not-blue’ in the presence of a red object it may be in response to a query from a person who doesn’t know the colour of the object and wrongly guesses that it is blue . The important point to note is that Skinner is using both context and intersubjective communication as a key to understanding how the qualifying autoclitic ‘no’ is typically used.
Skinner’s emphasis on intersubjective communication and social reinforcement is important as a way of supplementing Russell’s account. A person may eventually learn to use the word ‘white’ and check if there are any objects in the environment matching it but and therefore derive the negative judgement ‘not white’ but this process will be reliant on two more fundamental processes. (1) Our innate biologically given expectations of what is salient in our environment (2) Shaping by our sociolinguistic group in how to appropriately use the word ‘no’.